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“All that the best men can do is to persevere in doing their duty to their country and leave the 
consequences to Him who made it their duty; being neither elated by success however great nor 
discouraged by disappointments however frequent or mortifying.” - John Jay, 1785. 
 
“Few books (if properly read) afford more useful lessons than the lives of great men…to enjoy 
the experience of others without paying the price which it often cost them is pleasant as well as 
profitable—mankind is the same in all ages, however diversified by color, manners, or customs.” 
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INTRODUCTION: “A SYSTEM SO DEFECTIVE” 
As the presidential election of 1800 unfolded in favor of the Democratic-Republicans, John 
Adams began to pack the judiciary with Federalist nominees. In December, after Oliver Ellsworth 
resigned as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court due to health concerns, Adams needed to find 
someone to fill that office immediately. He first wrote to John Jay, the inaugural Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court. “In the future administration of our country the firmest security we can have 
against the effects of visionary Schemes or fluctuating theories, will be in a solid Judiciary,” 
Adams explained, “and nothing will cheer the hopes of the best Men so much as your Acceptance 
of this appointment.” Realizing that the reign of the Federalists might be over, Adams thought that 
the “visionary schemes” of Thomas Jefferson and his Democratic-Republicans endangered the 
young country. A Federalist judiciary with Jay at its head provided the United States “the firmest 
security” against the instability of a new administration. Adams concluded, “It appeared to me that 
Providence had thrown in my Way an Opportunity not only of marking to the Public, the Spot, 
where, in my Opinion the greatest Mass of Worth remained collected in one Individual but of 





dissolution of Morals.” Adams affirmed his faith in Jay as a leader—a man who Adams could trust 
in preserving the laws of the Republic. As flattering as the letter was, it also emanated a certain 
Federalist desperation.1   
 Jay responded about two weeks later, on January 2, 1801. He started by reflecting on his 
experience as Chief Justice, beginning twelve years prior. With nothing but Article III of the 
Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 to guide him, Jay held the great responsibility of 
establishing and leading the national court system. This task proved much easier said than done. 
“Such was the Temper of the Times, that the Act to establish the judicial courts of the U.S., was 
in some Respects more accommodated to certain Prejudices and Sensibilities, than to the great and 
obvious Principles of sound Policy,” Jay wrote. “The Efforts repeatedly made to place the judicial 
Departmt. [sic] on a proper Footing, have proved fruitless.” Initially eager to establish the judiciary 
as equal in power and privilege to the legislature and the executive, Jay quickly became 
disillusioned with the court system. After only five years, he “left the Bench perfectly convinced 
that under a System so defective, it would not obtain the Energy weight and Dignity which are 
essential to its affording due support to the national Governmt.; nor acquire the public Confidence 
and Respect, which, as the last Resort of the Justice of the Nation, it should possess.” All that said, 
he had no desire to lead “a system so defective” again. Ostensibly citing his poor health, he 
respectfully declined Adams’ offer.2 
 Adams went on to nominate John Marshall as the next Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. 
A staunch Federalist, Marshall undoubtedly delivered on Adams’ wishes. For nearly forty years, 
 
1 From John Adams to John Jay, December 19, 1800. https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/99-
02-02-4718 
 






he revolutionized the Supreme Court’s power, most notably establishing the principle of judicial 
review in the case of Marbury v. Madison. It often seems that Marshall’s great achievements 
dwarfed anything Jay accomplished in his tenure. Yet Adams’ initial request suggested that Jay 
was more than worthy of holding the position of Chief Justice again. Jay’s response illustrated his 
frustration with the judiciary and his struggle to establish it as an effective, equal branch of 
government. The different perspectives expressed in these two letters raise important questions 
about the early years of the Supreme Court, and, more specifically, Jay’s involvement in it.  
  Given John Marshall’s achievements, many historians of the early Republic and legal 
scholars alike quickly dismiss the Jay Court as insignificant in the Supreme Court’s institutional 
development. Histories of the Supreme Court often gloss over these early years, and one scholar 
has even gone so far as calling the court’s first decade a “play’s opening moments with minor 
characters exchanging trivialities.”3  Even dedicated Jay biographers like Richard Morris use 
Marshall as the standard of judicial greatness: if Jay had returned to the high court in 1801, Morris 
argues, then seminal decisions like Marbury v. Madison “would very probably have been written 
by Jay, whose views Marshall so completely shared.”4 Time and time again, historians and legal 
scholars have portrayed Jay as only a precursor to Marshall.  
Comparisons between the two jurists rest on three assumptions that often go unquestioned. 
First, scholars assume that as Federalists, Jay and Marshall had the same understanding of legal 
jurisprudence. As explained above, historians like Richard Morris believe that as members of the 
same party, Jay and Marshall would have naturally come to the same conclusions about landmark 
 
3 Robert McCloskey, quoted in Sandra Van Burkleo, “‘Honor, Justice, and Interest’: John Jay’s Republican 
Politics and Statesmanship on the Federal Bench,” in Seriatim: The Supreme Court before John Marshall (New 
York: New York University Press, 1998), 28.  
 





cases. Second, scholars assume that the political situations of Jay and Marshall were similar 
enough to claim that Jay could have, if he tried hard enough, elevated the Supreme Court to the 
stature that Marshall did. Finally, and most fundamentally, scholars assume that Jay and Marshall 
had the same vision for the court. If that is true, then we must see Jay’s tenure as Chief Justice as 
a failure to execute that vision in comparison to Marshall’s tenure.  
This thesis disputes all three of those assumptions. Using the 1801 exchange between Jay 
and Adams as our point of departure, this project is an attempt to understand the Jay Court on its 
own terms, without the shadow of Marshall looming over it. It will build on the work of a small 
but convincing group of historians and legal scholars who have attempted to articulate Jay’s unique 
vision for the court and the challenges he faced in executing it. This project, in turn, contributes to 
the fields of early American history and legal history in three ways. First, unlike other legal 
histories, this thesis transcends legal procedure to reconstruct a vivid picture of life as a Justice on 
the Supreme Court in the 1790s. Mixing the institutional, the political, and the personal, the project 
considers how the duties of the court frustrated Jay and even drove him to the disillusionment he 
expressed to Adams in 1801. The Judiciary Act of 1789 established that Supreme Court Justices 
had to do much more than simply hold sessions of the Supreme Court twice a year in the nation’s 
capital. They also had to trek across the United States on three established “circuits” to hear cases 
at an appellate level. Traveling hundreds of miles on these circuits twice a year, the Justices 
experienced the loneliness that came with life on the road, the dissatisfaction that came with 
lodging in public houses for weeks at a time, the health issues that long stretches of hard travel 
brought on the body, and the myriad of experiences that came with meeting citizens from all walks 





Second, the project examines the Founders’ diverse views on federalism in the years 
immediately following the Constitution’s ratification. Modern conservative jurists and scholars 
often argue that the Founders had an “original intent” in creating the Constitution or that there was 
an original commonly understood interpretation of the Constitution’s words in the public sphere. 
The legal, cultural, and political battles of the 1790s demonstrate otherwise. The case of Chisholm 
v. Georgia best illustrates this tension between different strains of federalism, as the battle between 
federalism as nationalism and federalism as state sovereignty becomes apparent in the opinions of 
Jay and Associate Justice James Iredell.  
Finally, the thesis seeks to help Jay claim his place among our most well-known and well-
respected Founders. Today, Washington, Franklin, Hamilton, Madison, and Jefferson sit at the 
forefront of American historical imagination surrounding this period. Popular historians and 
American culture at large have neglected Jay for many reasons, but three stand out above the rest. 
The first is that he lacked the revolutionary character, fervor, and vision that other Founders 
brought to the narrative of the new nation’s earliest years. As Walter Stahr notes, “John Jay was 
the most conservative of the leading founders. He was a reluctant revolutionary, and many of his 
friends and relatives became loyalists.”5 A member of New York’s aristocratic class and a student 
at Queen’s College, Jay undoubtedly found the Revolution troubling at first. Indeed, he did not get 
involved in anti-imperial activities until 1774, and even in revolutionary activities, he always 
presented himself as a moderate.  
The second reason is that his personal life lacked the drama that invigorated other 
Founders’ lives. While Washington led the new nation to victory in war, Jay pushed papers around 
in Albany. While Hamilton famously pulled himself up from the bottom of society to establish the 
 





nation’s financial system, had an illicit affair during the height of his power, and died in a duel 
with the sitting vice president, Jay’s generational wealth ensured that he never suffered from want, 
his faith led him to be a devout and diligent husband, and he quietly retired from politics without 
any bad blood.6 While Jefferson penned the Declaration of Independence and Madison played a 
major role in writing the Constitution, Jay focused on supporting those movements in his home 
state of New York. He became too ill to play a major part in the Federalist project, and the circuit 
court often took him away from the conflicts within Washington’s cabinet. In modern American 
popular culture, as the Founders undergo a resurgence in popularity through new biographies, 
documentaries, and even musicals, Jay has never taken a central role in the narrative of the nation’s 
founding.  
These popular narratives are deceptive, as Jay undoubtedly played a pivotal role in the 
American Revolution and the early American Republic. His contributions to the Revolution, first 
as a member of the Continental Congress and then as a diplomat in Spain and France, were 
essential in securing independence for the new nation. Likewise, as a dedicated Federalist, he 
vigorously fought for the ratification of the new Constitution in newspapers and on the floor of the 
New York ratifying convention. Finally, as Chief Justice, Jay not only led the Supreme Court in 
its most infant moments, but he also helped develop the system of appellate courts central to our 
judiciary today. All the while, in his later years as Chief Justice, he negotiated a treaty with Britain 
that, while unpopular, prevented war for another decade.  
The third and perhaps most practical reason that historians have neglected Jay is because 
so many of his personal papers have been lost. Historically conscious and intensely private, Jay 
and his sons destroyed many of his personal papers before his death in 1829. Though Columbia 
 
6 Indeed, John Jay: The Musical certainly would not be produced on Broadway or receive several Tony 





University and the Founders Online Archive are working to make all of his extant papers available, 
any historian of Jay must recognize that the surviving documents, to a certain degree, were curated 
by the man himself. More than most Founders, Jay challenges historians to read between the lines, 
make inferences about his emotions, and work vigorously to discern his private perspectives.   
Despite these challenges, some historians have delved into John Jay and his judicial legacy 
and produced rich scholarship about his time on the Court. Sandra Van Burkleo situates Jay in his 
unique political and cultural context to argue that he deserves to be known as more than simply 
Marshall’s predecessor. She explains that Jay wove together several different legal, political, and 
economic philosophies to create his own understanding of jurisprudence. “Jay merged High 
federalism and political conservatism with free-trading economic liberalism,” she contends. “For 
this rigidly principled man, and for many of his friends, conservative republicanism and Smithian 
political economy coexisted quite peaceably, bound together by an encompassing framework of 
moralizing, stabilizing public law.”7 First examining his “road to reluctant patriotism,” she 
contends that as a revolutionary, Jay “urged internal centralization, reliance upon a few enlightened 
statements, and strict attention to federal law—the embodiment of reason and divine morality—in 
order to secure” the nation’s prosperity.8 She highlights the Calvinistic fatalism imbedded within 
his thought, and she moreover emphasizes his deep concerns with democratic rule, as well as his 
fear of mobocracy. Interested in trade and economics, Jay always sought to be a diplomat; he 
avoided burning bridges in his personal and professional life. 
The most interesting part of Van Burkleo’s argument comes as she examines Jay’s 
conception of the court. She writes that Jay was excited about being nominated in 1789, as he saw 
 
7 Van Burkleo, 29.  
 





the Court as an excellent institution for “the cultivation of domestic unity, equitable trade relations, 
and a working alliance between executives and judges.”9 Moreover, he thought that the national 
judiciary had a special responsibility in instilling civic virtue into the people. The laws of the 
republic served as “rules for regulating the conduct of individuals” not only in a legal sense, but 
also a moral one. By 1794, however, Jay realized that his vision of the court as an “arbiter of the 
‘common good’” and a “diplomatic and moral umpire” would not come to fruition. The harsh 
response to Chisholm v. Georgia drove him away from the judiciary and back into the realm of 
diplomacy. Van Burkleo concludes that the Jay Court’s story, above all else, “increases the 
distance between 1789 and 1801, clarifying and complicating our understanding of how the third 
branch came to occupy modern ground.”10 While Jay and Marshall had led only twelve years apart, 
their worlds were vastly different—Jay had no court to inherit, as he built it out himself. Marshall, 
conversely, had more than a decade of national precedent to draw from. For Van Burkleo, Jay’s 
legacy laid not in his ability to advance the vision that Marshall saw, but in his leadership in 
establishing the Court as an institution and trying to use it to serve the ends he saw fit.  
William Casto explores how the Jay Court, more than later courts, found itself enmeshed 
in almost every aspect of federal governance: the handling of debt, issues of state sovereignty, and 
even foreign policy and the enforcement of peace treaties. Like Van Burkleo, Casto sings Jay’s 
praises as Chief Justice, but he does so for different reasons. While Van Burkleo championed Jay 
for his unique vision, Casto presented him as a practical leader who gave the court political capital. 
In filling the court, George Washington “sought men whose public reputation would enhance the 
government’s political legitimacy,” and the selection of Jay “exemplified this concern.” Jay’s 
 
9 Van Burkleo, 52. 
 





extensive career of national service gave the Court the legitimacy it needed, and once heading it, 
he proved to be a strong leader. “Although Jay’s service on the Court was brief and his only major 
opinion was in the Chisholm case,” Casto contends, “his appointment was a success because his 
presence assured the nation that the Court would be led by a man of sound judgement.”11 
Moreover, Jay contributed significantly to the statecraft that Washington and his administration 
engaged in throughout the 1790s. Jay and the Associate Justices “sought to assist in the 
establishment of an energetic national government that could effectively defend itself from attacks 
by foreign and domestic foes, and they were successful in those efforts.”12 For Casto, Jay served 
as a symbol of national power, and his court was essential in transforming the Constitution from a 
piece of parchment to a set of vigorous, effective institutions.  
Not all scholars of Jay are so straightforward in their praise of his tenure on the court. 
Matthew Van Hook takes a more nuanced approach to the Jay Court when he argues that Jay 
“achieved a type of founding success, but missed an opportunity to achieve the sort of lasting 
judicial greatness that his Federalist heir John Marshall realized.”13 Closely examining three of 
Jay’s most pivotal cases—Heyburn’s Case, Chisholm v. Georgia, and Glass v. Sloop Betsy—Van 
Hook claims that Jay might have been able to take “first steps in entrenching his Federalist political 
goals into the judiciary, not by ruling differently, but by ruling more explicitly.”14 Van Hook 
carefully considers several other important facets of the Jay Court, like Jay’s unique role as a 
presidential advisor in foreign policy and the conflicts that arose from the circuit court. His 
 
11 William Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic: The Chief Justiceships of John Jay and Oliver 
Ellsworth (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1995), 248.  
 
12 Casto, The Supreme Court in the Early Republic, 253. 
 
13 Matthew Van Hook, “Founding the Third Branch: Judicial Greatness and John Jay’s Reluctance,” 
Journal of Supreme Court History, 40, no. 1 (March 2015), 1. 
 





historical research is sound, but he relies on counterfactuals to bolster his argument too often. In 
the introduction, for example, Van Hook asks readers to consider an alternate history: “if Jay had 
remained Chief Justice until his death in 1829, his forty-year tenure would have included the 
opportunity to rule on nearly all of the “great” cases that came before John Marshall and placed 
him as the longest serving Supreme Court Justice to this day.”15 Likewise, in the conclusion, he 
claims, “Had Jay remained and established a more vocal Supreme Court, less supportive of the 
other branches and more detached from the national government, he may have been the first name 
in American law.”16 While interesting, these sorts of remarks detract from his well-grounded 
historical analysis. Van Hook likewise falls into the trap of claiming that Jay and Marshall would 
have ruled the same way on landmark cases. This assumption is dangerous insofar as it ignores 
that Marshall and Jay had vastly different temperaments, philosophies, and leadership styles. In 
spite of these shortcomings, Van Hook offers readers a detailed and nuance analysis of Jay’s 
judicial decision making. 
 While Van Burkleo, Casto, and Van Hook focus particularly on Jay’s time as Chief Justice, 
Walter Stahr offers the first full biography of Jay written in the twenty-first century, and perhaps 
more importantly, in more than seventy years. Unlike most academic works, Stahr sets out to write 
a biography of Jay simply for the purpose of telling “the story of Jay’s life to a new generation of 
Americans.”17 Stahr indeed accomplishes that goal, as he tours through every part of Jay’s life in 
detail, dividing his chapter primarily by the many different posts he held through his illustrious 
career in public service. Stahr presents Jay as a virtuous man, steadfast in his convictions yet 
 
15 Van Hook, “Founding the Third Branch,” 2.  
 
16 Van Hook, “Founding the Third Branch,” 17. 
 





always willing to make compromises with his political opponents in order to advance the common 
good. His narrative is primarily a triumphal one, but it is nonetheless filled with the trials and 
tribulations that Jay faced throughout his life. Regarding his time on the Supreme Court, Stahr 
writes: 
Above all, Jay suffers by comparison with his great successor, John Marshall. To the extent 
that one can forget about Marshall and focus on Jay, however, he accomplished much in 
his four years on the court…Both in his work in the Supreme Court and especially in his 
work as a circuit justice, he helped to make the federal courts a reality, to bring federal 
justice “to every man’s door.”18 
 
Of the works examined above, Stahr undoubtedly has the best narrative and pace. His work is a 
refreshing reminder that Jay’s service on the Supreme Court was only a small part of his storied 
career of service. In writing for a popular audience, Stahr falls short only insofar as he sacrifices 
depth for pace, as he merely scratches the surface on a number of important essays, opinions, and 
treaties that Jay wrote. For the scholar or the student of history interested in learning about Jay, 
however, Stahr’s work would serve as an accessible foundation.  
Drawing from the strengths of each of these authors—the intellectual aspects of Burkleo’s 
analysis, the practical politicking ingrained in Casto’s argument, the nuance of Van Hook’s piece, 
and the narrative style that Stahr produced—as well as Jay’s public and private papers, this thesis 
is an attempt to blend the personal, the political, the legal, and the institutional aspects of the Jay 
Court into a singular cohesive narrative. Chapter One offers a detailed intellectual history of Jay. 
Beginning in New York City, it follows Jay through the first forty-five years of his life—from his 
time as a plucky young law clerk in New York City to his frustrating and tragic time as an 
ambassador in Madrid, all the way through his first public address as the first Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court. Primarily concerned with his writings on law and government, the chapter centers 
 





around analyses of his Federalist essays, his famous Address to the People of New York, and his 
role in crafting treaties. It relies primarily on the work of Walter Stahr in establishing context for 
these pieces. It concludes with a close reading of his earliest address to grand juries on the circuit, 
where he conveyed great optimism about the Federalist project and meditated the value of 
republican government and the common good. Ultimately, this chapter reveals how Jay’s extensive 
career in public service shaped his understanding of federalism as nationalism. Though a jurist at 
heart, Jay cared deeply about all three branches of government, and he wanted to build out the 
entire federal government to be powerful so it could defend American interests and promote 
national prosperity.  
 Chapters Two and Three explore why Jay found the judicial system so “defective” that he 
refused to return in 1801. Chapter Two examines the benefits and burdens of riding the circuit. 
Beginning with a plea from Jay to Washington and Congress, the chapter explains how the circuit 
courts presented the Justices both logistical and constitutional conundrums. Jay’s circuit court 
diaries, a useful, unique, yet puzzling source base, are used to reconstruct his life riding the circuit. 
Likewise, Jay’s decisions, primarily about debt cases in the Eastern circuit, are examined to 
illustrate the role of the circuit court in the judiciary, and newspapers are considered to demonstrate 
the circuit court’s relative popularity throughout the young nation. It soon became clear to Jay that 
“bringing justice to every man’s door” came at a serious cost to the court: infighting, division, and 
even physical and emotional pain. The chapter concludes by examining exchanges between Jay 
and his colleagues about riding the circuit. For years, they bickered amongst themselves and 
battled against Congress for relief and reform in the duty, but they had little to show for it. When 





 Chapter Three begins twelve years before Jay was appointed Chief Justice. In 1777, a South 
Carolina merchant tried to recoup payment from the state of Georgia regarding war supplies he 
sold it. Long after the merchant’s death, Georgia remained steadfast in its refusal to pay his 
executors, and the claim ended up on Jay’s docket in 1793. Georgia refused to appear before the 
Supreme Court, leaving Attorney General Edmund Randolph to argue on behalf of the plaintiff 
unopposed. The court ruled against Georgia 4-1, with James Iredell dissenting. The opinions of 
Jay and Iredell sit at the center of the chapter, as they offer the reader two different understandings 
of federalism. Iredell’s dissent offers a foil to Jay’s federalism as nationalism examined throughout 
the first two chapters, since Iredell establishes federalism first and foremost as a system designed 
to protect states’ rights. Jay’s opinion defended his national vision, and he argued that only a 
vigorous national government can provide individuals justice and equality under the law. Though 
Jay ruled in the majority among the Justices, the majority of Americans—both Federalist and Anti-
Federalist alike—rejected Jay’s vision. Congress quickly passed the Eleventh Amendment, a total 
rebuke of Jay’s opinion that affirms the states’ power over the federal government, and they 
submitted it to the states for ratification less than a year after Jay’s opinion became public. 
Disturbed by this response, Jay shifted his attention away from the judiciary to focus on foreign 
affairs, as tensions between England, France, and the United States flared. While Chief Justice, 
Jay went to England to negotiate a treaty, and upon his return, he resigned from the court to serve 
as the Governor of New York. Above all else, the chapter demonstrates that Chisholm v. Georgia, 
serves as a turning point in Jay’s determination to execute a national vision. Whereas before, he 
saw himself as a central actor in that plan, he afterwards became a much more passive jurist and a 





 This project is not an exhaustive biography of Jay, nor is it an all-encompassing study of 
his career on the Court. It only briefly considers his two candidacies for the governor of New York 
and his participation in the Jay Treaty, all of which occurred while he was Chief Justice. Nor does 
it break ground in evaluating Jay’s deep faith, his confounding stance on slavery, or his loving 
relationship with his wife. Instead, this thesis is only a humble attempt to tell the story of the birth 
of America’s most enigmatic national institution and the man who tried to bring it from Article III 
















AN ARCHITECT OF AMERICAN UNION: 
 JOHN JAY’S RISE TO NATIONAL PROMINENCE 
 
“While reason retains her rule, while men are as ready to receive as to give advice, and as 
willing to be convinced themselves, as to convince others,” John Jay wrote, “there are few political 
evils from which a free and enlightened people cannot deliver themselves.” These words began 
Jay’s An Address to the People of the State of New York published on April 15, 1788, in the midst 
of New York’s fierce battle over the ratification of the Constitution. Almost a year earlier, 
delegates from across the young United States gathered in Philadelphia to amend the Articles of 
Confederation. As they struggled to make changes, however, their course quickly changed; they 
soon abandoned the Articles entirely in favor of a new Constitution. Though Jay did not attend the 
convention in Philadelphia, he was pleased with its final product—so much so that he swiftly 
became one of its most fervent proponents. Jay’s Address defended the new Constitution with 
vigor and verve.1  
Jay began by explaining the “political evils” of his day, namely the structural flaws inherent 
in the Articles and the problems that consequently emerged. Under the Articles, Jay argued, 
 
1 John Jay, An Address to the People of the State of New York on the Subject of the Constitution, Samuel 





Congress paradoxically held all the power and none of it. Congress could “make war, but are not 
empowered to raise men or money to carry it on. They may make peace, but without power to see 
the terms of it observed,” he wrote, “They may borrow money, but without having the means of 
repayment.” Jay explained that Congress, in sum, “may consult, and deliberate, and recommend, 
and make requisitions, and [the states] who please, may regard them.” But, of course, the states 
were not obliged to accept any of those suggestions. The federal government lacked any authority 
to act on its own behalf, and the United States was worse for it.2  
The new Constitution had the potential to strengthen the federal government and thus the 
country. Presenting the document as a collaboration across all thirteen states, Jay praised the 
members of the Convention. He found it impressive “that they were able so to reconcile the 
different views and interests of the different States, and the clashing opinions of their members as 
to unite with such singular and almost perfect unanimity in any plan whatever, on a subject so 
intricate and perplexed.” Concerned citizens from across the new nation had come together to 
create a new system that could bind the states closer together and form a strong union, rather than 
a weak confederation.3  
Throughout his career, Jay often reflected on the value of American union. Only by 
directing the competing interests of the young nation towards a national common good, he 
believed, could the United States grow strong and prosperous. This belief did not develop 
overnight; instead, it was the result of years of public service. As President of the Continental 
Congress in the late 1770s, Jay witnessed how the Articles’ structure inhibited the war effort. 
Likewise, as a diplomat to Spain and France in the early 1780s, he experienced serious frustrations 
 
2 Jay, Address to the People of New York, 3.  
 





as thirteen states tried to conduct foreign policy independently and simultaneously. Eager to 
replace the Articles with a document that created an effective national government, Jay became an 
ardent Federalist in the late 1780s. He penned essays and pamphlets that defended the proposed 
Constitution, and he played an important role in New York’s ratifying convention.  
By the time that George Washington appointed him Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 
1789, Jay was less concerned with the narrow goal of crafting a powerful judiciary and more 
concerned with American statecraft writ large: the process of building a strong, cohesive national 
government in the years immediately following ratification. Rather than one of three competing 
branches, he saw the courts as a tool that could help keep harmony in the early nation and even 
“bring justice to every man’s door.”4 But to understand Jay’s tenure as the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court, we must consider how he ended up leading the high court in the first place. To 
that end, this chapter will explore Jay’s early life and career with particular attention to the 
development of his political and legal philosophy. Ultimately, Jay articulated and worked to 
implement a vision of American union as robust as anyone from the period. That vision of union 
was an outgrowth of his years of varied public service, and it, in turn, had a significant influence 
on his jurisprudence and his conception of the courts.   
“A Youth Remarkably Sedate” 
 
 Born to Peter Jay and Mary Van Cortlandt Jay in 1745, John Jay grew up comfortably in 
New York City. The studious son of a wealthy mercantile family, he entered King’s College at 
fourteen. There, he studied the Classics, philosophy, theology, literature, and natural science. 
While New York’s hustle-and-bustle, taverns, and even brothels tempted many college-aged boys, 
 
4 John Jay, “Charge to the Grand Juries of the Eastern Circuit, 12 April–20 May 1790,” Founders Online, 
National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0133. [Original source: The Selected 






Jay prudently stuck to his studies. His father described him as “a youth remarkably sedate,” and in 
a letter to a friend, Jay described himself as “bashful” and “pertinacious.” Often attending services 
at Trinity Church, Jay demonstrated a strong attachment to his faith that would serve as the 
foundation for his worldview for years to come.5  
 Towards the end of his time at King’s College, Jay took an interest in law. Entering the 
legal profession was not easy, however, because as Walter Stahr explains, “There were, at this 
time, no law schools; the only way to become a lawyer was to serve as a clerk to a senior lawyer.” 
Lawyers in the eighteenth century rarely received a formal legal education, so they had to learn by 
clerking, or helping a senior lawyer with administrative duties. To start his career, Jay began 
clerking for Benjamin Kissam, a prominent New York City lawyer, in June of 1764. He spent four 
years working with Kissam, and those years were invaluable for the budding attorney. Often left 
to his own devices to do research in Kissam’s expansive law library, Jay soon became regarded as 
“remarkable for strong reasoning powers, comprehensive views, indefatigable application, and 
uncommon firmness of mind.”6 He and Kissam developed a close professional relationship, and 
Jay flourished under Kissam’s tutelage.  
 After clerking for four years, Jay opened his own practice in November of 1768. Partnering 
with his close friend and King’s College classmate Robert Livingston, Jay sought to establish 
himself as a serious lawyer in an incredibly competitive profession. One prominent case he 
undertook involved a border dispute between the colonies of New York and New Jersey. Serving 
as the clerk to the commission charged with this case, Jay had a hefty responsibility: “to take notes 
 
5 Stahr, John Jay, 12. In “Honor, Justice, and Interest,” Sandra Frances Van Burkleo writes on Jay’s faith 
further: “A devoted Anglican, [Jay] nevertheless remained conscious for a lifetime of his family’s Huguenot origins; 
indeed, his notorious admiration of Great Britain reflected considerable gratitude that his forebears had been 
provided ‘an Asylum.’ Old Testament and apocalyptic imagery punctuated his prose, alongside pointed analogies 
between public and private salvation or states of grace” (33).  
 





and prepare the official record [of the commission’s proceedings], which ran to over seven hundred 
pages of questions, answers, and arguments.” Yet that project was an anomaly in Jay’s legal career. 
“The majority of his cases were simple actions to recover commercial debts. And there were many, 
many such cases: in 1773 he had more than a hundred cases pending in the [New York] Supreme 
Court and another hundred pending in the Westchester court,” Stahr writes. 7  
Rising in wealth and reputation, Jay soon became one of New York’s most successful 
lawyers. He soon married Sarah Livingston, a daughter of the wealthy Livingston family. By the 
early 1770s, Jay seemed to have built a comfortable, complete life for himself. Surprisingly absent 
from Jay’s correspondence in the early years of his career is any discussion of imperial politics. 
Aside from brief mentions of more local New York political issues, Jay seemed to neglect the 
rapidly deteriorating relationship between Great Britain and her colonies.8 
Reluctant Revolutionary, Proficient President 
 
  That changed in 1774. Distressed by the harsh British response to the Boston Tea Party, 
Jay threw himself into local and continental politics. After he joined a city committee to respond 
to the events in Boston, the people of New York City quickly nominated him, along with four other 
men, to represent the colony at the Continental Congress in Philadelphia. Far younger and less 
experienced than the other delegates, Jay was nevertheless eager to “do his part in resolving the 
differences between the ‘mother country’ and the ‘daughter colonies,’” Stahr explains.9  
 Jay established himself as a forceful writer with his Address to the People of Great Britain, 
read to the Congress on October 29, 1774. His message to Great Britain’s citizens was simple: 
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though the actions of their Parliament had been destructive to the colonies, the people of America 
were eager to retain their relationship with the people of Britain. “This unhappy country has not 
only been oppressed, but abused and misrepresented,” he wrote. But at the same time, he claimed 
that the colonies “hope that the magnanimity and justice of the British Nation will furnish a 
Parliament of such wisdom, independence and public spirit, as may save the violated rights of the 
whole empire.” Ultimately, he wanted the colonies and England to “restore that harmony, 
friendship and fraternal affection” that was “so ardently wished for by every true and honest 
American.”10 In this address, Jay distinguished himself in the delegation for his conservative 
approach, appealing to the notions of reconciliation and repair. While others were advocating for 
an immediate break from Britain, Jay’s message of moderation carried the day; he received 
applause and approval from his peers, and Congress left on the agreement that they would only 
boycott British goods, not separate from the empire entirely.11  
 Returning to New York satisfied with the results of the Congress, Jay stepped out of politics 
for several months. He entered again during the Second Continental Congress in the summer of 
1775, where Morris writes that he “assumed a prominent role as a leader of the moderate faction.”12 
As the boycott had improved relations with Britain, the Continental Congress needed to reassess 
its strategies. Jay held a particularly important position on the Congress: a seat on the committee 
to draft another petition to the king, serving alongside John Dickinson and Ben Franklin among 
others. Jay’s papers reveal that he wrote an early draft of what became the Olive Branch Petition—
 
10 John Jay, “Address to the People of Great Britain, 21 October 1774,” Founders Online, National 
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-01-02-0071. [Original source: The Selected Papers of 
John Jay, vol. 1, 1760–1779, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2010, pp. 100–
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a last-ditch effort to restore the colonies’ relationship with the Crown. The well-known moderate 
from Pennsylvania John Dickinson wrote the final draft of the petition, and, as Stahr notes, 
comparing it with Jay’s draft “suggests that Jay was more conciliatory than even the members of 
Congress known as the leader of the conciliators.”13 Neither the content of the petition nor its 
author could change what seemed to be the inevitability of war, however. Recognizing the 
situation, Jay began corresponding with the French to establish a new alliance; playing both sides, 
he was simultaneously “working to reconcile with Britain and to establish relations with Britain’s 
mortal enemy, France.” Demonstrating serious pragmatism, he knew that if relations with Britain 
continued to deteriorate, the colonies would need new European allies to defend themselves.14 
 Jay’s intuition was right. Though the Congress would not receive word until much later, 
the Crown received the Olive Branch Petition and rejected it entirely in September of 1775. Britain 
demanded absolute submission from the colonies. The imperial crisis continued to worsen, and 
almost a year later, the colonies were in complete revolt. They declared their independence in July 
of 1776. At first, Jay was not especially eager to break with Britain, but, as Stahr explains, “when 
faced with the difficult choice between the British King and British freedom, [Jay] chose freedom.” 
Stahr continues, Jay “chose to fight for freedom: for it was far from clear in the summer of 1776 
that the American rebels, opposed not only by British troops but also German mercenaries and 
loyalist enemies, could defend their independence and their freedom.”15 A piece of parchment 
alone could not establish American independence. Instead, the newly created United States was 
now at war with Great Britain, the world’s largest, most powerful empire. 
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 Jay’s contributions to the war effort were wide-ranging. First focusing on establishing 
defenses for the city and then the state of New York, Jay soon turned to working with spies and 
conspiratorial committees.16 Still occasionally publishing essays, he wrote to the public to inspire 
hope after the war effort took a grim turn in 1776. His pamphlet from December of that year, An 
Address of the Convention of the Representatives of the State of New York to Their Constituents, 
passionately defended the war effort, no matter how grim it seemed in the moment.17 “It is,” he 
began, “not only necessary to the well-being of society, but the duty of every man, to oppose and 
repel all those, by whatever name or title distinguished, who prostitute the powers of government 
to destroy the happiness and freedom of the people over whom they may be appointed to rule.” No 
matter how tempting it might be to give into King George’s pressure, he argued, the colonies would 
never be free under his rule again. Jay’s words invoked patriotism, duty, and honor: “When your 
country is invaded and cries aloud for your aid, fly not to some secure corner of a neighbouring 
State,” he advised his fellow Americans, “but share in her fate and manfully support her cause.” 
Speaking to the best of the American citizenry, he urged, “Let universal charity, public spirit and 
private virtue, be inculcated, encouraged and practised. Unite in preparing for a vigorous defence 
of your country, as if all depended on your own exertions.”18 Jay’s pamphlet, emphasizing the 
 
16 Kyle Burgess briefly mentions Jay’s involvement with spies in Chapter Two of his thesis. Burgess writes, 
“The ring members would also incorporate other forms of trickery in their writings, such as the usage of 
‘sympathetic ink’ which future Supreme Court Justice John Jay supplied to Washington and Tallmadge and the 
addition of a code dictionary which replaced names and nouns for certain numbers.” For more information, see 
Burgess and Alexander Rose’s Washington’s Spies: The Story of America’s First Spy Ring, 104-120. Quoted with 
permission from the author.  
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stakes of the moment, came at a critical juncture in the war: just days before Washington crossed 
the Delaware and won the Battle of Trenton.  
 In the summer of 1777, Jay also began serving as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court 
of New York. His first tenure in a judicial post, albeit brief, was important insofar as he helped 
direct the state government as it struggled to fight the British. He sat on a committee for Public 
Safety, met with Governor George Clinton often, reviewed legislation, and held both civil and 
criminal trials. A British invasion soon forced Jay and other officials to flee from Kingston, where 
the court was located, towards Connecticut. Jay was right to leave—the Battle of Saratoga took 
place right nearby Kingston almost as soon as he departed. While today, Saratoga is considered a 
turning point in the war in favor of the revolutionaries, Stahr explains that Jay and his family 
viewed the battle much differently. Stahr writes: 
Jay probably agreed with his sister-in-law Susan, who wrote to denounce the generous 
surrender terms [Horatio] Gates offered to Burgoyne, allowing all the troops to leave 
America. ‘The British troops will go home and garrison the forts abroad, and let those 
garrisons come to America, so it will be only an exchange of men.’ Jay probably also agreed 
with his friend James Duane, who wrote to rejoice in ‘Burgoyne’s total defeat’ but also to 
caution that Washington’s troops were ‘ill clad and the weather is uncommonly severe.’19 
 
Despite the war going on around him, Jay presided over New York’s Supreme Court for two terms. 
While the cases he dealt with were often local in scale—murder trials, for instance—he nonetheless 
developed an appreciation for the judiciary’s broader institutional power during this time. Trying 
to keep the spirit of the Revolution alive in his words, he reminded one jury of the value of New 
York’s new state constitution. “Let it be remembered, that whatever marks of wisdom, experience, 
and patriotism there may be in your constitution,” he wrote, “from the people it must receive its 
spirit, and by them be quickened. Let virtue, honor, the love of liberty and of science be, and 
remain, the soul of this constitution, and it will become the source of great extensive happiness to 
 





this and future generations.” Aware of the significance of the bench, Jay was unafraid to be 
political in his tone and spirit during these early years as a judge. Yet, given how the war demanded 
so much from public servants, he would not be able to stay in this position for long.20  
Jay soon moved from the judicial branch to the legislature, as he served as the President of 
the Continental Congress from the winter of 1778 to the fall of 1779. After Henry Laurens of South 
Carolina stepped down, Jay was elected. Gouvernour Morris noted that “the weight of his personal 
character contributed as much to his election as the respect of the state.” Yet Jay’s new job was 
hardly prestigious. Its powers were never clearly defined and it boasted a high turnover rate. Jay’s 
primary responsibilities were twofold: to preside over meetings of the Congress and to be its 
primary correspondent with the states. Although the first role was somewhat limiting, Stahr notes 
that the president’s role after debates had a judicial tinge: “prior to each important vote, the 
President would summarize the issue, somewhat like a judge summarizing for a jury.” But Jay 
spent most of his presidency fulfilling his second duty, writing letters on behalf of Congress. In 
his ten-month term, he wrote over five-hundred letters himself, where he made recommendations 
to states, asked for payments on loans, requested movement for troops, and worked to guide the 
war effort.21  
  Separated from his family and residing in Philadelphia alone for four months, Jay 
corresponded often with Sarah. Eventually, he found a home for them to rent, and they shared it 
with her two siblings who assisted Jay in his duties. There, Sarah and John hosted diplomats from 
Spain and France, and Jay established his prowess as a negotiator and a cultural ambassador. All 
the while, states clashed about resources, land, and money—the events across the continent led 
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some to dub 1778-1779 as the “year of frustration.” Yet Jay held the Congress together with firm 
leadership. “Jay performed capably the basic tasks of the President: presiding over the sessions, 
handling the correspondence, and meeting the dignitaries,” Stahr writes, but “perhaps his greatest 
contribution may have been in preventing a quarrelsome Congress from descending into fistfights. 
In light of the circumstances, he was a good President, indeed one of the better Presidents of the 
Congress.”22  Above all else, Jay’s experience as president was edifying. It exposed him to the 
weaknesses of the Articles, especially the ineffectiveness of the executive leadership under the 
current system. Likewise, he developed important diplomatic skills that would serve him well for 
years to come.  
Troubles in Spain, Successes in France 
Jay’s time as the president of the Continental Congress came to an end when he received 
an invitation for a new post. Impressed with his skill in entertaining diplomats, the Continental 
Congress named him Minister to Spain in September 1779. He quickly accepted the position, but 
the new job posed a serious question for the Jay family: what would Sarah and Peter, their infant 
child, do? 
 The couple decided that Peter would remain in the care of his maternal grandparents, the 
Livingstons. Sarah, however, would join John abroad. This decision surprised many. As Stahr 
explains, “Sarah was unusual, unique, in deciding to join her husband on his revolutionary 
diplomatic mission. Other similarly situated wives, including Elizabeth Dean and Abigail Adams, 
remained at home.” Eleven years John’s junior, Sarah was only twenty-three in 1779. A trip across 
the ocean was always dangerous, especially during wartime, and her family had their hesitations 
about her decision. Despite her youth, the daughter of the famous Livingstons had risen to the 
 





occasion in the past few months. Receiving diplomats at the Jays’ home in Philadelphia had 
sparked her interest in helping John with his diplomatic work. Though little of Sarah’s 
correspondence from this period survives, the extant letters reveal that duty to her husband and her 
country drove her decision to travel with him.23 
John and Sarah departed for Spain in October of 1779 with simple instructions: seeking 
“recognition, alliance, and financial support” from the empire. But John believed these goals were 
much easier said than done, as he wrote to George Washington that they, “however just, will 
probably not be easily attained, and therefore [the mission’s] success will be precarious, and 
probably partial.”24 As Stahr explains, “Even these modest expectations were to prove too high.” 
This diplomatic mission would soon prove to be a disaster.25 
After a tumultuous journey by sea, the Jays arrived in Spain early in 1780. In tow were 
Jay’s secretary William Carmichael and Sarah’s brother Brock Livingston. Upon his arrival, Jay 
also purchased a fifteen-year-old enslaved boy named Benoit to assist him with his duties.26 
Landing at the port of Cadiz, Jay quickly sent Carmichael ahead to Madrid, the capital, with a 
letter announcing his arrival and intent. Months later, after mishaps with letters and ministers, Jay 
received a response from the foreign minister, the Conde de Floridablanca. Floridablanca’s letter 
was not encouraging, since Spain did not yet formally recognize the United States as a nation, and 
thus, as Stahr explains, “it would not officially receive Jay as a Minister, merely as a private 
citizen.” Jay’s arrival in Madrid did little to help. Floridablanca refused to even begin negotiations, 
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and after several months of trying, Jay was only able to secure a few thousand dollars for the war 
effort. Unable to build an alliance or even secure official recognition for the young United States, 
Jay had become increasingly frustrated with his task. Yet Stahr suggests that the mission’s failure 
did not rest squarely on Jay’s shoulders. “Perhaps the real error was with Congress,” Stahr wrote, 
“which should have realized that he would not be able to secure recognition or assistance.” Jay’s 
friendly correspondence with Benjamin Franklin, an ambassador in Paris at the time, strengthens 
Stahr’s claim here. Franklin, too, was appalled at Spain’s treatment of the young United States, 
and he often offered his younger colleague words of advice and financial support.27 
The Spanish mission took a personal toll on the Jay family as well. Both John and Sarah 
had, during different parts of their stay, become incredibly ill with a strain of the flu going 
throughout Spain. Likewise, Sarah had become pregnant soon before their departure in October of 
1779, and she gave birth to a girl in July 1780. But only a few weeks later, tragedy struck; the 
newborn passed away. The Jays had to remain steadfast in their important work, but their 
correspondence reveals the deep sadness the death of their daughter brought them. At the same 
time, their relationships with their convoy became strained: Carmichael and John became 
increasingly distant, and Sarah became fed up with Brock’s less-than-diplomatic activities, like 
going to taverns and brothels late at night. Sarah believed he did not represent the United States 
properly, and they often fought about his behavior. Between the political failures and the personal 
struggles that the Jays endured during their two years in Spain, this voyage had proved itself to be 
far more destructive than productive by 1781.28  
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The news of victory at Yorktown came as much needed relief for both John and Sarah. 
Working in Paris on behalf of the American government, Benjamin Franklin quickly wrote to John 
urging him to come to Paris. “Here you are greatly wanted, for messengers begin to come and go,” 
he wrote, “but I can neither make or agree to propositions of peace without the assistance of my 
colleagues.” With Franklin’s words in mind, the Jays left Spain in May of 1782 and never looked 
back.29 
The Jay family arrived in Paris almost a month later. Meeting up with Franklin, who had 
established himself not only as a prominent diplomat but also a favorable socialite, John soon was 
introduced to “the Spanish Ambassador Aranda, the British representative Grenville, and the 
Marquis de Lafayette, who was acting as a self-appointed liaison between the Americans and the 
French.” Yet before Jay’s work really began, the flu struck him for almost two months. Franklin, 
refusing to act without his partner, held up much of the talks, because he did not want to “enter 
into particulars without Mr. Jay, who is now ill with the influenza.” Upon Jay’s return to the table, 
there was a new British representative: Richard Oswald. More than seventy years old, Oswald had 
little experience in government; he was a successful merchant whom the British government 
thought could represent their interests well. In the months that followed, Jay and Oswald worked 
closely together to draft a peace treaty that satisfied the young United States and Britain. 30 
 Above all else, Jay wanted Britain’s recognition of the United States as a sovereign and 
independent nation. That did not come easily from Oswald, who often waffled in the scope of his 
commission’s charge. The two diplomats debated about lines of jurisdiction, trade routes, and most 
importantly, how the two nations, if Britain accepted the United States as a nation, would treat 
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each other. In November 1782, they agreed on the Preliminary Articles of Peace, a document that 
demonstrates Jay’s strength as a negotiator.31 He wrote the original preamble himself, and it 
remained in the final document ratified by both diplomacy teams. The document begins:   
Whereas reciprocal Advantages, and mutual Convenience are found by Experience, to form 
the only permanent foundation of Peace and Friendship between States; It is agreed to form 
the Articles of the proposed Treaty, on such Principles of liberal Equity, and Reciprocity, 
as that partial Advantages, (those Seeds of Discord!) being excluded, such a beneficial and 
satisfactory Intercourse between the two Countries, may be establish'd, as to promise and 
secure to both perpetual.32  
Emphasizing a new, “permanent foundation” of amiable relations between the two nations, Jay 
secured from Britain a commitment to recognize the United States as a sovereign nation. Stahr 
writes that Jay’s role in the initial negotiations was essential. Jay “secured the trust and 
administration of the British negotiators, making them in many cases effective internal advocates 
for the American position.” Likewise, he and his team “secured for the future United States an 
immense territory” and above all else laid the “permanent foundation of peace and friendship” 
between the two nations.33  
 Yet this document was only a provisional peace treaty—something more permanent was 
necessary to settle the conflict between the governments, not just the diplomats, and begin to 
rebuild relations practically. While Franklin had the unenviable task of selling a peace plan to the 
French, Jay took up the mantle for convincing Congress to get on board. Stahr writes, “Jay was 
concerned about reports of quarrels among the American states, and about the possibility that 
European nations might try to exploit any divisions” as disputes about boundaries and trade 
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continued to dominate negotiations. “To Washington,” Stahr notes, Jay “wrote that ‘the increasing 
power of America is a serious object of jealously to France and Spain as well as Britain. I verily 
believe they will secretly endeavor to foment divisions among us.’” And to his friend Gouvernor 
Morris, Jay explained, “I am perfectly convinced that no time is to be lost in raising and 
maintaining a national spirit in America. Power to govern the confederacy, as to all general 
purposes, should be granted and exercised.” 34 These early letters reflect concerns that Jay would 
eventually expand upon in the Federalist papers: above all else, the independence of the states 
created more problems than it solved. A strong, unifying national government was the solution.  
 But Jay’s concerns about the Articles, for now, were a digression from his priorities as a 
diplomat. After extensive, sometimes frustrating, correspondence between Jay and Secretary 
Livingston, Jay received initial confirmation of Congress’ approval for the treaty in late 1783. 
Franklin, Jay, and John Adams signed the American-British treaty in Paris in September, and later 
that day, they travelled to Versailles to watch the British sign peace treaties with the other 
governments involved in this conflict. Reflecting on this day, Jay wrote, “We are now thank God 
in full possession of peace and independence. If we are not a happy people now it will be our own 
fault.” Months later, in March 1784, the formal ratification from Congress came to Jay, Franklin, 
and John Adams, and they knew their job was complete. After nearly five years abroad, with two 
new children and the passing of another one, with their nation’s independence and reputation 
secured, John Jay and Sarah embarked on the Edward to return to their beloved home city of New 
York in June 1784.35 
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“Let Congress legislate. Let others execute. Let others judge.” 
Returning home, Jay found more time to write to his friends and colleagues. His 
correspondence from this time reveals a deep dissatisfaction and even frustration with the Articles 
of Confederation. Expressing his feelings in a letter to Thomas Jefferson, Jay wrote that the 
structure of their government was “fundamentally wrong.” Too much power had been invested in 
the Continental Congress; instead, he believed, the powers of government needed to be “so 
distributed [across the three branches] as to serve as checks on each other.”36 Or, as he put it so 
simply to George Washington, “Let Congress legislate. Let others execute. Let others judge.”37  
The news of a convention to amend the Articles in the summer of 1787 must have come as 
a relief to Jay. Though he did not attend the convention, he corresponded with many of its 
participants, and soon after the document was released to the public, he quickly jumped to its 
defense. The historical record suggests that the idea for the Federalist papers may have even 
originated at Jay’s house. On October 22, 1787, Jay held a dinner party at his home in New York, 
and according to Sarah’s records of dinner guests, Alexander Hamilton and James Madison were 
both in attendance. Though no further details about the party exist in the papers of Jay, Madison, 
or Hamilton, Stahr speculates that it could have been the inception point of the Federalist essays: 
“Hamilton and Jay and perhaps Madison discussed how to best respond to [anti-Federalist] 
opposition and agreed to work together on a series of essays.”38 Only five days later, Hamilton 
anonymously published the first Federalist piece in New York’s Independent Journal.  
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Jay then picked up his pen, writing the next four installments. On October 31, 1787, he 
published the second Federalist essay. There, he argued that the new nation’s success was 
dependent on cooperation, not competition, between the states. “This country and this people seem 
to have been made for each other,” he wrote, “and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, 
that an inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united to each other by the 
strongest ties, should never be split into a number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.” If 
the states remained a loose confederation that resembled a trade agreement more than a unifying 
government, they might begin to develop competitive, even hostile relationships with each other. 
To close, he wrote, “It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every succeeding Congress, 
as well as the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity 
of America depended on its Union.”39 
Three days later, on November 3, Jay expanded on the importance of union in Federalist 
III. In the case of the United States, that union is best established under “an efficient national 
government,” as it “affords them the best security that can be devised against HOSTILITIES from 
abroad.” In foreign affairs, he claimed, a single national government would be superior to “thirteen 
separate states” or “three or four distinct confederacies” for three reasons. First, the national 
government would draw from the talent of the whole country, not just a single state, and as a result, 
the best citizens would rise to the highest levels of government to serve the nation and its interests. 
Second, since one government, rather than thirteen, would deal with foreign nations, international 
policies “will always be expounded in one sense and executed in the same manner.” Finally, 
 






because thirteen states composed the national government, actions or problems in one or two states 
could not jeopardize the national government’s relationship with foreign powers.40  
Jay wrote that if the governing party in a single state attempts to act contrary to the interests 
of the union at large, the new constitution’s system ensures that it will have “little or no influence 
on the national government, the temptation [to deviate] will be fruitless, and good faith and justice 
be preserved.” Moreover, he claimed that the strength and power that came from the United States 
government as a single union dwarfed any that could come from thirteen smaller, weaker 
confederate states’ governments acting independently. “It is well known that acknowledgments, 
explanations, and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong united nation,” 
he wrote, “which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered by a State or confederacy of little 
consideration or power.” Sensitive to foreign relationships due to his own time spent as an 
ambassador, Jay knew that executing foreign policy from one channel, rather than thirteen, paved 
the best path forward for national and global success.41  
Jay emphasized the international benefits of union further in Federalist IV, published on 
November 7. First summarizing his arguments from the previous essay, he wrote that a national 
government “can move on uniform principles of policy. It can harmonize, assimilate, and protect 
the several parts and members, and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In 
the formation of treaties,” he continued, a strong national government “will regard the interest of 
the whole, and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of the whole.” Diplomacy, 
of course, was important to Jay, but he also valued the military advantages of a national 
government. He asked, “Leave America divided into thirteen or, if you please, into three or four 
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independent governments—what armies could they raise and pay—what fleets could they ever 
hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly to its succor, and spend their blood and 
money in its defense?” Sitting at his desk writing this essay, he likely thought back to his time as 
the president of the Continental Congress. Under the Articles of Confederation, Jay struggled with 
the same issues he wrote about nearly a decade later, especially raising and paying thirteen separate 
armies during a period of crisis. While the Revolution had been successful, that military system 
was surely unsustainable.42  
Jay ended the essay with two disparate visions of the United States going forward. On one 
hand, if foreign powers saw “that our national government is efficient and well administered, our 
trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and disciplined,” Jay wrote, “they will be 
much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke our resentment.” But, on the other 
hand, if the states failed to unite under a national government and foreign powers “find us either 
destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or wrong, as to its rulers may seem 
convenient), or split into three or four independent and probably discordant republics or 
confederacies,” he worried, “what a poor, pitiful figure will America make in their eyes!” With 
some states or confederacies finding an ally in France, others in England, and others in Spain, Jay 
feared that anything but a national government would allow foreign powers to sow division in the 
newly established United States.43  
Moving inward, Jay next concerned himself with the domestic implications of anything 
less than a strong, vigorous national government in Federalist V. If there was no overarching 
structure to guide the interests and harness the energies of the states, Jay believed, disaster would 
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ensue. “Instead of [the states] being ‘joined in affection’ and free from all apprehension of different 
‘interests,’” Jay wrote, “envy and jealousy would soon extinguish confidence and affection, and 
the partial interests of each confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would be 
the only objects of their policy and pursuits.” Rather than a single nation, multiple confederacies 
might form, and North America might soon resemble Europe with rigorous borders and warring 
nation-states. Jay prudently envisioned that the primary division would be between Northern and 
Southern states, and he worried especially that if separate confederacies formed, the powers of 
Europe might play the confederacies against each other to weaken them further. “It is far more 
probable that in America, as in Europe, neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite 
interests and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different sides,” he 
concluded.44 After publishing this essay, Jay became seriously ill with rheumatism, and he stepped 
away from the Federalist project.  
Six months later, in March of 1788, Jay returned for one final contribution. Titled “The 
Powers of the Senate,” Federalist XLIV explored the Constitution’s delegation of foreign policy 
affairs to the President and the Senate. “The convention have done well,” he claimed, “in so 
disposing of the power of making treaties, that although the President must, in forming them, act 
by the advice and consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of intelligence 
in such a manner as prudence may suggest.” By giving the president the authority to act and 
negotiate on behalf of the county, the Constitution lends him significant power. Yet because he 
can receive “advice and counsel” from the Senate, he can pull from what Jay saw as a body of 
America’s finest statesmen. “Thus,” he wrote, “we see that the Constitution provides that our 
negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can be derived from talents, information, 
 





integrity, and deliberate investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on the 
other.”45 The “Advice and Counsel” clause, then, had two benefits: giving the president the access 
to the finest talent in the nation while at the same time giving him the flexibility to act and negotiate 
independently as needed.  
Jay then responded to some objections to the “Advice and Counsel” clause, especially 
uncharitable interpretations of it. Some Anti-Federalists worried that the President and the Senate 
might work together in a cabal, yet Jay rejected that argument. “He must either have been very 
unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or possess a heart very susceptible of such 
impressions” who can imagine such corruption in the government. “The idea is too gross and too 
invidious to be entertained,” he said. Likewise, since all “the States are equally represented in the 
Senate, and by men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of their 
constituents,” the majority of the population could never create a treaty that negatively impacts a 
minority unless it garnered more than half of the states as well.46  
Soon after his final Federalist submission, Jay released his own anonymous meditations 
on the Constitution in his Address to the People of New York. Published in April 1788, the 
pamphlet first critiqued the Articles of Confederation and offered an argument in favor of 
ratification. Jay proceeded to answer three questions New Yorkers might have had about the 
proposed Constitution: whether or not a better plan could be made, whether or not a new plan 
could be crafted “in season,” and lastly, “what would our situation be, if after rejecting this, all our 
efforts to obtain a better plan should prove fruitless?” To answer that first question, he again 
emphasized the sensibilities of those at the Convention. “They tell us very honestly that this plan 
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is the result of accommodation—they do not hold it up as the best of all possible ones, but only as 
the best which they could unite in, and agree to.” Three months of deliberation from delegates 
across the United States had produced this document, “the best of all possible ones,” a system 
grounded in compromise and collaboration, rather than competition, amongst the states. He 
doubted, then, the practicality of repeating that feat and establishing another new plan if this one 
failed. “Although contrary causes sometimes operate similar effects, yet to expect that discord and 
animosity should produce the fruits of confidence and agreement, is to expect ‘grapes from thorns, 
and figs from thistles,’” he explained.47  
Even if a new plan could be made, Jay argued, the delays involved would put the nation at 
risk of further political instability. He painted a villainous picture of other nations acting against 
the United States “in our present humiliated condition.” England might take the opportunity to 
“alienate the hearts of our citizens from one another.” France and other foreign creditors may not 
“continue patient” with American delays on payments. The young nation might not be able to build 
an army to defend itself as needed. He concluded by meditating on the common good of the nation: 
the need for unity in order to prosper. He asked New Yorkers to “Consider then, how weighty and 
how many considerations advise and persuade the people of America to remain in the safe and 
easy path of Union; to continue to move and act as they hitherto have done, as a band of brothers.” 
He wanted them “to have confidence in themselves and in one another; and since all cannot see 
with the same eyes, at least to give the proposed Constitution a fair trial, and to mend it as time, 
occasion and experience may dictate.”48 Emphasizing compromise, collaboration, and progress, 
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Jay saw the debates on the Constitution as a way for the American citizenry to become more 
engaged, educated, and involved in the political process.49  
 But Jay did not just write pamphlets and essays during the Ratification period.  He was also 
an active participant in the ratifying convention at Poughkeepsie in the summer of 1788. After 
weeks of unproductive deliberation and debate between the Federalists and the Antifederalists, Jay 
crafted the final document that bridged the gap between the two on July 26. In a circular letter that 
would be sent out to the states upon New York’s ratification, he wrote: 
Several articles in it appear so exceptionable to a majority of us, that nothing but the fullest 
Confidence of obtaining a Revision of them by a general Convention, and an invi[n]cible 
Reluctance to separating from our Sister States could have prevailed upon a sufficient 
number to ratify it without stipulating for previous Amendments. We all unite in opinion 
that such a Revision will be necessary to recommend it to the approbation and Support of 
a numerous Body of our Constituents.50 
 
Jay brought together these two factions to ratify the Constitution with the understanding that the 
newly formed Congress would amend and improve it immediately. The next day, Jay’s 
compromise won the day; it got the convention to vote in favor of ratification thirty to twenty-
seven. New York became the eleventh state to ratify the Constitution, and the pressure from the 
circular letter, in turn, played an important role in establishing the need for a Bill of Rights, the 
anti-Federalists’ greatest objection to the proposed Constitution. Stahr summarizes Jay’s 
achievements during the ratification period nicely: “He helped form the consensus that strong 
national government was necessary; he provided several key concepts, such as the supremacy of 
national laws; he wrote powerful essays in support of the new Constitution; and above all, through 
 
49 Although Jay was weary of “the People,” referring to the masses, he nonetheless believed that an 
educated citizenry was the only pathway to maintaining republican governance and not descending into despotism.  
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quiet compromise, he persuaded the Antifederalists at Poughkeepsie to accept and ratify the 
Constitution.” 51 Again, Jay’s temperance, moderation, and willingness to compromise paved the 
way for a stronger conception of  American union.  
A Court for the Common Good 
 Enough states ratified the Constitution that a new national government began that same 
month, July 1788, and George Washington quickly became the first president of the United States. 
Now, together with the newly elected Congress, Washington had the great task of taking the 
abstract framework that the Constitution laid out and turning it into a living, breathing set of 
institutions. This work was demanding and time-consuming, and Washington took it seriously. 
Regarding the Supreme Court, “Washington was keen to have as Chief Justice not only an eminent 
lawyer, but a man well known and well respected throughout the nation,” Stahr writes.52 Given his 
esteemed record of public service to the young nation, John Jay fit that description perfectly. 
Though he had not expressed his wish to Jay yet, Washington nominated him to the Senate on 
September 26, 1789, and he was confirmed the same day. Writing to Jay just a few days later with 
his commission, Washington expressed his excitement at the potential of Jay leading the federal 
judiciary. He wrote: 
I have a full confidence that the love which you bear our Country, and a desire to promote 
general happiness, will not suffer you to hesitate a moment to bring into action the talents, 
knowledge and integrity which are so necessary to be exercised at the head of that 
department which must be considered as the Key-Stone of our political fabric.53 
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Washington’s language here, describing the judiciary as the “key-stone of our political fabric,” 
demonstrated his deep interest in the third branch of government. Not only was Jay’s career of 
public service impressive enough for him to earn the nomination for the Chief Justice of the 
Supreme Court; Washington also took special note of his “talents, knowledge, and integrity.” 
Washington wanted moral leaders, not just lawyers, at the head of the judiciary. Jay fit that mold 
perfectly. The next day, Jay graciously responded, “With a Mind and a Heart impressed with these 
Reflections, and their correspondent Sensations, I assure you that the Sentiments expressed in 
your Letter of Yesterday, and implied by the Commission it enclosed, will never cease to excite 
my best Endeavours to fulfill the Duties imposed by the latter.”54 With that letter, Jay accepted the 
nomination and became the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court.  
One of Jay’s first duties as a justice was to “ride the circuit,” or to adjudicate cases 
throughout the country.55 In order to make sure that Supreme Court Justices were well-acquainted 
with the whole nation, the Judiciary Act of 1789 divided the country into three circuits and 
mandated that the judges hear cases on them for a portion of the year.56 Riding across the Eastern 
Circuit in April and May of 1790, Jay opened every session of court with a charge to the grand 
jury. Stahr explains, “Today a charge to a grand jury is generally a dull recital of the details of the 
relevant criminal laws. At this time, however, a grand jury charge was a chance for the judge to 
discuss general legal and political principles.” Jay’s April 1790 “Charge to the Grand Juries of the 
 
54 “From George Washington to John Jay, 5 October 1789,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-04-02-0094. [Original source: The Papers of George 
Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 4, 8 September 1789 – 15 January 1790, ed. Dorothy Twohig. Charlottesville: 
University Press of Virginia, 1993, pp. 137–138.] 
 
55 The duty and burden of riding the circuit, established by the Judiciary Act of 1789, will be considered in 
Chapter Two.  
 
56 This decision was also a financial one: rather than paying judges specifically to serve on the circuit 
courts, Congress double-dipped on their Supreme Court Justices here. There were three courts: Eastern, Middle, and 





Eastern Circuit” was his first public reflection on the formation of the new government and how 
he saw the judiciary as a part of it. Jay was eager to explain the democratic importance of the 
jurors’ and the judiciary’s role in the new government. He delivered this charge four times: to the 
juries of New York and Connecticut in April 1790 and to the juries of Massachusetts and New 
Hampshire the next month.57   
Jay began the charge by reminding the jurors of the question at the heart of the American 
experiment: “Whether any People can long govern themselves in an equal uniform & orderly 
manner.” Jay then offered his own thoughts on how the new Constitution could help Americans 
govern themselves. “It is pleasing to observe that the present national Government already affords 
advantages, which the preceding one proved too feeble and ill constructed to produce,” he said. 
“How far it may be still distant from the Degree of Perfection to which it may possibly be carried 
Time only can decide.” Where the Articles of Confederation decentralized power, the Constitution 
centralized federal power into the three branches of government: executive, judicial, and 
legislative. As he had often argued before, he believed that the Constitution’s distribution of power 
among three federal branches was its greatest advantage compared to the Articles.58  
Yet, as Jay observed, creating the separate spheres of these branches had not been easy. 
“Much Pains have been taken so to form and define them, as that they may operate as checks one 
on the other, and keep each within its proper Limits,” he explained. For the success of the new 
government, it was essential “that they who are vested with executive legislative & judicial 
Powers, should rest satisfied with their respective Portions of Power.” These new government 
 
57 Stahr, John Jay, 275.  
 
58 John Jay, “Charge to the Grand Juries of the Eastern Circuit, 12 April–20 May 1790,” Founders Online, 
National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0133. [Original source: The Selected 






officials should neither “encroach on the Provinces of each other, nor suffer themselves, nor to 
intermeddle with the Rights reserved by the constitution to the People.” The Constitution 
demanded that all three branches partake in a sort of balancing act, where they must exercise their 
own power to the fullest extent while not overstepping into the spheres of the other branches.59  
So far, Jay had only reflected on the Constitution writ large; he had not offered his opinion 
on the court system itself. “These Remarks may not appear very pertinent to the present occasion,” 
he said, “and yet it will be readily admitted, that occasions of promoting good will, and good 
Temper, and the Progress of useful Truths among our Fellow Citizens should not be omitted.” 
Finally, Jay pivoted towards the construction of the courts. Referring back to the promotion of 
“good will” and the “progress of useful truths” among citizens, Jay explained, “These motives 
urge me further to observe, that a variety of local & other circumstances rendered the Formation 
of the judicial Department particularly difficult.”60  
He expanded on those difficulties. In theory, he believed that a “judicial controul, general 
& final, was indispensable.” The application of that theory, however, had proven difficult. “The 
manner of establishing [judicial control], with Powers neither too extensive nor too limited; 
rendering it properly independent, and yet properly amenable, involved Questions of no little 
Intricacy.” Like the executive and legislative branches, defining the judicial branch’s powers was 
a balancing act. On one hand, the judiciary needed to be “properly independent,” so that it could 
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check the other two branches; on the other hand, it could not be too powerful that it would 
compromise the new system of checks and balances. “The Expediency of carrying Justice as it 
were to every Man’s Door, was obvious,” he explained, “but how to do it in an expedient manner 
was far from being apparent.”61 
Defining the relationship between the states and the national government was, in Jay’s 
estimation, the greatest challenge facing the court. “To provide against Discord between national 
& State Jurisdictions, to render them auxiliary instead of hostile to each other; and so to connect 
both as to leave each sufficiently independent, and yet sufficiently combined, was and will be 
arduous.” Here, Jay provided an interesting interpretation of federalism. Rather than conflicting 
over power, the states and the federal government should be “auxiliary” to each other. Many 
Antifederalists and even some Federalists expected the relationship between the states and the 
federal government to be adversarial, as each fought to define their sphere of power and influence 
as robustly as possible. In Jay’s estimation, the two should ideally complement, not conflict with, 
each other in order to form the strongest, most efficient, and most effective government.62  
Building off his idea of auxiliary federalism, Jay concluded the charge with a meditation 
on the common good. “It cannot be too strongly impressed on the minds of us all,” he wrote, “how 
greatly our individual Prosperity depends on our national Prosperity; and how greatly our national 
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Prosperity depends on a well organized vigorous Government, ruling by wise and equal Laws, 
faithfully executed.” Individual prosperity was only possible in times of national prosperity, he 
believed, and for any sort of national prosperity to occur, the government must wisely and 
faithfully execute the laws. Yet each individual citizen had an important role to play in the success 
of the national prosperity. Their freedom and their liberty “consists not in a Right to every Man to 
do just what he pleases— but it consists in an equal Right to all the citizens to have, enjoy, and to 
do, in peace Security and without molestation, whatever the equal and constitutional Laws of the 
country admit to be consistent with the public good.”63 Each time, after delivering this charge, Jay 
took his seat and began holding court.  
Over the next few years, Jay struggled to build the courts for a number of logistical and 
structural reasons, just as he anticipated. But this charge, given right at the beginning of his tenure 
as Chief Justice, reflected a sort of cautious optimism absent from much of his later writings. That 
optimism was well-deserved. Jay had been working to create an American system of government 
that was independent, effective, and powerful for more than fifteen years. As he made clear, this 
charge was more than just pomp and circumstance to begin a court session—it was a culmination 
of his life’s work. Jay had come a long way from being the plucky law clerk at Benjamin Kissem’s 
office nearly two decades earlier. He had since struggled as the president of the Continental 
Congress and suffered both personal tragedy and political hardship as a diplomat in Spain, 
negotiating on behalf of a nation that no one yet recognized as sovereign and free. He had rejoiced 
in the halls of Versailles with Benjamin Franklin and John Adams when the Paris Peace Treaty 
was signed, and he had written and fought alongside Alexander Hamilton and James Madison in 
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order to ratify a new Constitution to strengthen the federal government. Now, with George 
Washington’s confidence, Jay was the highest magistrate in the land, responsible for building a 
court system to be the foundation of the new nation’s code of law. While a long road, both literally 
and metaphorically, laid before him as he traveled the circuit and implemented his vision for the 
judiciary, his life thus far demonstrated that Jay—the “remarkably sedate” young man, the 
moderate revolutionary, the frustrated diplomat, and the compromising Federalist—had become, 


















CHAPTER TWO:  
BRINGING “JUSTICE TO EVERY MAN’S DOOR”:  
THE BENEFITS AND BURDENS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT 
Reality quickly tempered Jay’s hopes for the judiciary. Each Justice’s annual duties—to 
hold two sessions of the Supreme Court in Philadelphia and to ride their respective circuits twice—
soon proved overwhelming. After nearly three years of grueling service, the Justices decided to 
make their struggles public. A letter written in Jay’s penmanship, signed by all six Justices, and 
sent to George Washington and the United States Congress in August 1792 illustrated their 
collective frustration. “We really, Sir, find the burthens laid upon us so excessive that we cannot 
forbear representing them in strong and explicit terms,” they wrote to the president. “On 
extraordinary Occasions we shall always be ready as good Citizens to make extraordinary 
exertions; but while our Country enjoys prosperity, and nothing occurs to require, or justify such 
severities, we cannot reconcile ourselves to the idea of existing in exile from our families.” Justices 
William Cushing, James Wilson, John Blair, James Iredell, Thomas Johnson, and Chief Justice 
Jay all were accomplished lawyers and patriots eager to serve the fledgling republic, but the 





hoped, would advocate for them in Congress, and in their letter to him, they enclosed a harsher 
message for the legislature.1 
The Justices were under the impression that that the Judicial Act of 1789, the law that 
established their double duty of Supreme Court sessions and circuit riding, established only “a 
temporary expedient, [rather] than a permanent System, and that it would be revised as soon as a 
period of greater leisure should arrive.” Of course, they recognized that the First Congress had 
plenty on its ledger, and they could not spend too much time ironing out the details of the judiciary 
before it even sat for court. Yet, as the Justices explained, the system as it stood took a serious toll 
on the six-man team. “The task of holding twenty seven circuit Courts a year, in the different 
States, from New Hampshire to Georgia, besides two Sessions of the Supreme Court at 
Philadelphia, in the two most severe seasons of the year,” they claimed, “is a task which 
considering the extent of the United States, and the small number of Judges, is too burthensome.” 
The time for reform, they believed, was now.2  
Riding the circuit was problematic for two reasons: one logistical and one constitutional. 
Logistically, holding circuit courts demanded that the Justices travel in April and May and then 
again in November and December. For those in the Eastern Circuit, like Jay, these winter trips 
across New York, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Connecticut, and Rhode Island proved brutal. 
Likewise, for those condemned to the expansive and humid Southern Circuit, like James Iredell, 
the early summer voyages through Virginia, the Carolinas, and Georgia were unbearable. “Some 
of the present Judges do not enjoy health and strength of body sufficient to enable them to undergo 
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the toilsome Journies through different climates, and seasons, which they are called upon to 
undertake,” the Justices contended, “nor is it probable that any set of Judges however robust, would 
be able to support and punctually execute such severe duties for any length of time.” Both time-
consuming and physically punishing, these circuit ventures were logistically unsustainable.3 
Yet the Justices’ concerns with the circuit courts were not singularly self-interested. They 
also argued that the initial arrangement of the federal judiciary established a system that could 
produce serious conflicts of interest. “The distinction made between the Supreme Court and its 
Judges, and appointing the same men, finally to correct in one capacity, the errors which they 
themselves may have committed in another,” they explained, “is a distinction unfriendly to 
impartial justice, and to that confidence in the Supreme Court, which it is so essential to the public 
Interest should be reposed in it.” The Judiciary Act of 1789 created several levels of federal courts, 
and by assigning the Justices to work on two different levels concurrently, the Act laid the 
groundwork for them to have to hear and rule on the same case on two different levels. Given that 
the Supreme Court had only heard four cases in its three years of existence thus far, this situation 
seemed unlikely at the time.4 Nevertheless, in an attempt to promote “impartial justice” and 
“confidence in the Supreme Court,” the Justices pursued this line of argument diligently.5   
With this letter in mind, this chapter will examine how the experience of riding the circuit 
shaped the Jay Court, with a particular focus on Jay’s experiences and opinions on the matter. First 
considering the provisions regarding circuit courts in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the chapter will 
proceed to explore the law’s practical implications by analyzing Jay’s travel diaries, 
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correspondence, opinions, and the public’s response to the Justices’ circuit journeys. It will 
conclude by surveying the conflicts that arose between the Justices about their circuit duties and 
their advocacy for reform. I argue that the duty of riding the circuit had a complicated impact on 
the Jay Court. On the one hand, it surely burdened the Justices physically, mentally, and 
emotionally. They spent months away from their families, always at the mercy of the weather and 
often in less-than-ideal lodging. On the other hand, by traveling across the country and meeting 
citizens from all walks of life, the Justices, especially Jay, helped establish trust in the new federal 
government—a necessary step in achieving the sort of union that Jay had envisioned for so long. 
Filling in the Gaps: The Judiciary Act of 1789 
Article III of the Constitution laid out only a barebones framework for the federal judiciary, 
leaving Congress the power to build it out.6 Congress took up the task early into their first 
legislative session in April 1789. Oliver Ellsworth, a practical, experienced attorney and legislator, 
led the committee that crafted the bill. Six months of intense deliberation ensued, and the resulting 
piece of legislation reflected the complexities of the committee’s legalistic debates.7  
The first sections of the Judiciary Act of 1789 clarified the federal judiciary’s operating 
structure. First, it established the size of the Supreme Court, declaring that it “shall consist of a 
chief justice and five associate justices.”8 It proceeded to divide the nation into thirteen districts, 
primarily across state lines, and it then established a district court, led by one judge appointed by 
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ordain and establish.” Sections 2—which establishes the scope of judicial power—and Section 3—a definition of 
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the president and confirmed by the Senate, in each of those districts. Next, it grouped those thirteen 
districts into three circuits—Eastern, Middle, and Southern—and established special circuit courts 
to hear appeals of decisions from the district courts. These courts would meet twice a year at each 
district within the circuit to do so.9  
The Act then explained the composition of the circuit courts, what Jay and his associate 
justices would take issue with three years later. Though it proved problematic in practice, it was 
originally written with a spirit of equality in mind. Section 4 articulated that “any two justices of 
the Supreme Court, and the district judge of such districts” would compose each circuit court, and 
these circuit courts would meet twice a year. Though the law itself did not offer the rationale 
behind the circuit court’s makeup, legal historian William Casto explains: 
The basic purpose of the circuit courts was to provide Supreme Court supervision of the 
federal trial courts without requiring expensive and inconvenient appeals from local federal 
trial courts to the national capital. Instead, circuit riding Justices would in effect make 
Supreme Court decision making more accessible to litigants throughout the country.10 
 
Given the expenses of travel and the early Republic’s lack of national infrastructure, this reasoning 
promoted equality of access to the most powerful judges in the land. Ideally, the merits of the case, 
not the ability of any participants to travel across the nation for lengthy hearings, would determine 
if the case would be taken up by the federal judiciary. In Jay’s words during his initial grand jury 
charge, he thought these courts would allow the federal government to “bring justice to every 
man’s door.”11 Casto points to Senator William Paterson of New Jersey to illustrate this rationale 
further. While deliberating on the bill, Paterson publicly remarked that this system of circuit 
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courts’ most appealing feature was its ability to “carry law to [The People’s] homes, courts to their 
doors.” Aside from the postal service, these courts were likely the only interaction an ordinary 
citizen would have directly with the federal government. This opportunity to get the judiciary out 
of the capitol and into local communities was exciting, innovative, and promising.  
  The Act also set the scope and power of the various courts. Section Eleven explained, “The 
circuit courts shall have original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, of 
all suits of a civil nature at common law or in equity.”12 Likewise, Section Twenty-Two 
established, “That final decrees and judgments in civil actions in a district court, where the matter 
in dispute exceeds the sum or value of fifty dollars, exclusive of costs, may be reexamined, and 
reversed or affirmed in a circuit court.”13 These two clauses, one concerning the relationship 
between state and circuit courts and the other concerning the relationship between district and 
circuit courts, together ensured the circuit court’s power to review decisions from lower tiers. 
Nevertheless, by mandating that the value of the civil dispute must be more than fifty dollars to be 
heard by the circuit court, Section Twenty-Two intended to prevent too many small claims from 
burdening its docket with small suits.  
 Finally, the Judiciary Act established how a case could reach the Supreme Court. Section 
22 of the legislation continued: 
And upon a like process, may final judgments and decrees in civil actions, and suits in equity 
in a circuit court, brought there by original process, or removed there from courts of the 
several States, or removed there by appeal from a district court where the matter in dispute 
exceeds the sum or value of two thousand dollars, exclusive of costs, be re-examined and 
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court, the citation being in such case signed by a judge 
of such circuit court, or justice of the Supreme Court, and the adverse party having at least 
thirty days’ notice.14  
 
12 Judiciary Act of 1789 §11. 
 
13 Judiciary Act of 1789 §22. 
 





This one clause, more than one hundred words long, delineated several things in relation to the 
Supreme Court’s scope and process. First, it explained that decisions from circuit courts, state 
courts, or district courts—with the caveat that the “dispute exceeds the sum or value of two 
thousand dollars exclusive” of legal fees—can all be evaluated by the Supreme Court. The 
Supreme Court holds the power to reexamine, and then reverse or reaffirm, any decisions made by 
these lower courts, provided that either a member of the Circuit Court or a Supreme Court Justice 
signs on to review the case. Finally, the parties involved, especially the “adverse” party, or the one 
disposed against further review, need at least thirty days’ notice to prepare for the Supreme Court’s 
rehearing of the case. The Act, complex and robust as it was, easily passed through Congress, and 
Washington began appointing judges to fill out the new judiciary.   
Reconstructing Life on the Circuit: Jay’s Travel Diaries and Road Correspondence 
Though the Judiciary Act was passed in September 1789, the first circuits were not held 
for another seven months. As the time neared for Jay and the other Justices to ride the circuit, 
Washington wrote to them expressing high hopes for their journeys. “As you are about to 
commence your first Circuit, and many things may occur in such an unexplored field, which it 
would be useful should be known,” he explained, “I think it proper to acquaint you, that it will be 
agreeable to me to receive such Information and Remarks on this Subject, as you shall from time 
to time judge expedient to communicate.” Echoing the sentiments of the Judiciary Act’s 
proponents like Senator William Paterson, Washington thought that the Justices’ travels would be 
a valuable resource for him. Just as Paterson thought the circuit courts would bring justice to “the 
People’s Doors,” so did Washington think the Justices would bring a better understanding of the 
people back to him and those leading the new federal government.15  
 
15 “From George Washington to the United States Supreme Court, 3 April 1790,” Founders Online, 





Jay did not personally respond to this letter, but he must have agreed with Washington that 
information he acquired while on the road would be valuable. Only days later, he began keeping a 
travel diary of his first circuit journey. Over the next five years, he would fill several more. 
Containing concise, often difficult to decode entries, these diaries likely reflected Jay’s primary 
concerns as he adjudicated his way throughout the Northeast. Jay rode the Eastern Circuit nearly 
ten times, and the entries in the diaries that accompany those trips revealed three of his main 
interests: the weather and climate, his lodgings, and the various people he met on his travels. 
Although those three aspects of life appear mundane on first glance, putting Jay’s travel diaries in 
conversation with his correspondence, other contemporary sources, and the work of other 
historians can help us reconstruct a fuller, more instructive, and more interesting understanding of 
life as a Supreme Court Justice in the 1790s. Indeed, these documents together reveal a deep 
tension between the federal and the hyperlocal in Jay’s life. Jay’s robust understanding of the 
federal government, neatly assembled across pamphlets, newspapers, and correspondence from 
the last twenty years, became much more difficult to enact in the real world than he anticipated. 
The difficulties of practical governance, of truly bringing “justice to every man’s door,” become 
all the more evident as we plumb what Jay wrote as he rode the circuit.  
 Historians have spilled much ink over the complicated nature of diaries as sources, and a 
brief survey of their scholarship can help us better understand the value of Jay’s travel diary. 
Martha Ballard, a midwife from Maine, kept over thirty years’ worth of journals, and her entries 
range from episodic dramas of seafaring adventures to long lists of daily chores. While many 
historians dismissed Ballard’s diary as an insignificant, uninteresting source, Laurel Thatcher 
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Ulrich argues that the mundane had great significance in understanding the “sinews of this earnest, 
steady, gentle, and courageous record…For [Ballard], living was measured in doing. Nothing was 
trivial.”16 Upon first glance, Jay’s travel diaries are similarly mundane. The topics that frequent 
his journals were certainly not heroic, nor were they dramatic or interesting. But, given that Jay 
spent so long traveling on the road, these typical entries are the “sinews” of Jay’s own “earnest, 
steady…and courageous record.” We cannot understand what life was like on riding the circuit 
without, as Jay did, thinking extensively about the weather, the lodgings, and the various 
encounters he had with citizens from so many backgrounds.  
 Likewise, the diary of Elizabeth Drinker, an upper-class woman from Philadelphia, helps 
us understand the value of working against the grain in unpacking this type of source. Drinker’s 
diary lacked the gossip, scandals, and other personal touches that one might expect from the diary 
of a wealthy socialite. Drinker “possessed both wit and a sense of humor, and even as she tried to 
suppress them, both escape to the pages of the journal,” Elaine Forman Crane writes, “Yet her 
diary is a cautious document, clearly designed to avoid personal and intimate revelations.”17 
Throughout his diaries, Jay often quipped about certain stories that do not belong in a diary. Crane 
accounts for the diary as an incomplete document, but one with gaps that are as helpful as they are 
frustrating. “In some cases,” she explains, “Drinker’s omissions are as revealing as her entries, 
although her forbearance was meant to illustrate her self-declared sensitivity to others.”18 Some of 
 
16 At the heart of Ulrich’s work sits this quotation: “It is in the very dailiness, the exhaustive, repetitious 
dailiness, that the real power of Martha Ballard’s book lies. To extract the river crossings without noting the cold 
days spent “footing” stockings, to abstract the births without recording the long autumns spent winding quills, 
pickling meat, and sorting cabbages, is to destroy the sinews of this earnest, steady, gentle, and courageous 
record…For [Ballard], living was measured in doing. Nothing was trivial.” Laurel Thatcher Ulrich, A Midwife’s 
Tale: The Life of Martha Ballard, Based on Her Diary (New York: Knopf, 1990), 9. 
 
17 Crane, The Diary of Elizabeth Drinker Volume 1 (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1991), XV.  
 






Jay’s omissions were similarly striking: though he was traveling through port cities and central 
economic hubs, he never mentioned encountering any enslaved people or witnessing anything to 
do with the slave trade. Given that he was a leader in the New York Manumission Society, that 
absence is noteworthy. Similarly, though he was a man of deep faith, Jay’s diaries rarely if ever 
reflected trips to church, conversations with ministers about theology, or personal reflections on 
religion. He rarely reflected on anything at all in these diaries; indeed, they were “cautious 
documents” in the strongest sense of the term. Keeping these two tropes—the value of the mundane 
and the idea of the “cautious document”—in mind allows us to analyze the diaries critically and 
holistically.   
Notes about the weather were abundant throughout Jay’s diaries. In April and May of 1790, 
for example, Jay was on the road for about twenty days, and he referenced the weather in at least 
half of his entries on those days. As he set out on April 16, it was a “Cloudy & chilly” day. The 
next day, he noted “wind at northeast & raw,” and the day that followed, there was a “violent 
Storm of Snow & afterwards Rain wind at No. East.” Curtly describing the scene, he explained 
that “much Rail Fence blown down.”19 Likewise, on the winter circuit from the same year, he 
noted rain four times, marked one day’s entry as simply “weather unpleasant,” and wrote about 
another where he lodged with “Mesrs. Gore & Trumbull” at the Adams’ Tavern at Ipswich Hamlet 
because they were all “confined by the weather.”20 Since Jay traveled throughout the Northeast in 
all four seasons of the year, the weather severely impacted his experiences. Nature, above all else, 
 
19 John Jay, “Circuit Court Diary, 16 April–30 May 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0134. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 240–258.] 
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determined the difficulty of his trip. Jay was often confined to a carriage that was either too hot or 
too cold, depending on the weather; snow trapped him at taverns, rain delayed the start of his treks, 
and the summer heat bore down on him, his servants, and his horses as they took long, unkempt, 
and winding roads. Delivering “justice to every man’s door,” it seemed, was easier said than done.  
Though Jay wrote little about the act of traveling itself, scholars have reconstructed maps 
from his diaries that illustrate how he moved throughout the Eastern circuit. In his Spring 1792 
circuit trip, for example, he departed from New York and rode north along the coastline for several 
days, arriving in New Haven. He held court there for a week, then traveled northward through 
central Connecticut to arrive in Springfield, Massachusetts. Next, Jay moved eastward through 
rural western Massachusetts, and he arrived in Boston almost ten days after leaving New Haven. 
He held court in Boston for five days, traveled almost fifty miles north to Portsmouth, New 
Hampshire, to hold court for four days, then nearly another one hundred miles south over nine 
days to do so in Newport. Moving again through Connecticut, this time westward, Jay made his 
way up to Bennington to hear cases in Vermont at the end of June. Finally, to return home, he 
traveled south along the Hudson River.21 Moving hundreds of miles and leading five different 
court sessions in two months was no small feat, but Jay did so for years. He held himself to a strict 
and rigorous travel schedule, demonstrating discipline and devotion to his circuit court duty 
irrespective of its inconvenience.  
 
21 “Circuit Court Diary, 15 April–1 June 1792,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0210. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 






Figure 1: Map of Jay’s Travels on the Eastern Circuit, Spring 1792 
SOURCE: “Circuit Court Diary, 15 April–1 June 1792,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0210. [Original source: The Selected 
Papers of John Jay, vol. 5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of 
Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 389–395.] 
 
 Jay’s “zig-zagging” travel routes from the map above speak to the nature of travel and roads 
in the early Republic (Figure 1).22 Postal roads and travel channels were still in the early stages of 
their development; only decades into the nineteenth century did travel across the nation become 
easier. As historian William MacIntosh explains, “Travelers at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century generally thought of their travel as something that they produced themselves, out of the 
raw materials of geographical knowledge, means of transportation, and provisions for the road.” 
MacIntosh uses the travel account of a young man named William Richardson from 1815 to 
illustrate the burdens of early American travel. “Richardson had to know where to go, how best to 
 
22 “Riding the Circuit: Editorial Note,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0132. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 





get there, and what the current conditions along his route were,” MacIntosh explains. “He also had 
to choose and acquire the means of getting to his destination, including transportation, lodging, 
and provisions. He acquired these raw materials for travel haphazardly and improvisationally as 
he went, and used them to construct a journey for himself that was as idiosyncratic as it was 
exhausting.”23 Traveling almost twenty-five years earlier than Richardson, Jay likely encountered 
similar challenges, and some were certainly exacerbated given how much younger the nation was. 
The complex route that we see above, followed in the Spring of 1792, was the result of years of 
circuit-riding; Jay had ridden the Eastern Circuit four times before, and by Spring 1792, he likely 
had developed a strong understanding of the fastest ways through the Northeast. Yet Jay’s wealth 
and status ensured that he traveled more comfortably than most—as Landa Freeman observes, 
often in a carriage rather than on horseback and often in a private carriage rather than a public one. 
Jay even had the luxury of bringing his law library with him as he rode across the country, further 
demonstrating his special access to resources as he traveled.24   
 One letter Jay sent to Washington further illustrated his own perspective on the nation’s 
roads. Along with several other advisory opinions, Jay argued that Congress had the “power to 
establish post Roads.” Nevertheless, he explained, simply establishing those roads would do little 
to help connect and grow the nation. “This would be nugatory,” he explained, “unless it implied a 
power either to repair these Roads themselves or compel others to do it.”25 Given the timing of 
 
23 William Mackintosh, “‘Ticketed Through’: The Commodification of Travel in the Nineteenth Century,” 
Journal of the Early Republic, Spring 2012, Vol. 32, No. 1 (Spring 2012), 63.  
 
24 As much as this fact demonstrated privilege, it was also likely out of necessity: Jay could never have 
been sure that he would have easy access to legal materials as he landed in a town. Landa Freeman, “Mr. Jay Rides 
the Circuit,” The Journal of Supreme Court History Volume 31 Issue 1 March 31 2006, 19.  
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this letter, Stahr argues, Jay “was not only commenting on the atrocious quality of the roads: he 
was creating the legal basis for the federal government to become involved” in the act of “building 
and maintaining national roads.”26 This letter not only demonstrates how Jay believed that 
Congress should be more active in helping build the young nation, but it also further exemplifies 
how greatly he valued national union. Only with a robust network of postal roads, turnpikes, and 
toll bridges, much improved from the ones he found himself on, could letters, goods, and people 
move easily across the thirteen states.  
Jay also commented on his lodgings across the circuit, but he rarely wrote highly of them. 
A series of entries from the Winter 1790 circuit diary illustrate his discomforts. He began his 
journey on difficult footing, since he “put up at Hiltons Tavern at Albany— they seem poor—& 
are extravagant in Charges.” In three consecutive entries only two weeks later, as he passed 
through New York, he remarked that he dined at Colonel Pratt’s “pretty good house,” then lodged 
at the Sheffield’s “not extraordinary” house, then “Took breakfast at Canaan at Bushs—House but 
middling.”27 Remarks like these appear often throughout the diaries, demonstrating how Jay 
actively examined, evaluated, and judged the places that he ate and stayed.  
 Since Jay so frequently complained about his lodgings, we might ask why he—the Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court and one of the nation’s most eminent political figures—put up with 
conditions he disliked for so long. The answer lies in his firm dedication to impartiality. Jay 
received plenty of invitations to reside in the homes of friends and local officials, but he almost 
always declined. As Stahr explains, Jay “wanted to avoid the appearance that he owed favors to 
 
26 Stahr, John Jay, 279.  
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those whose interest, in one way or another, would come before the federal courts.”28 This principle 
meant that Jay found himself refusing everyone from Governor of Massachusetts John Hancock 
to U.S. Senator and prominent New Hampshire merchant John Langdon.29  
 Instead, Jay found himself at the mercy of tavernkeepers to provide him food to eat, a bed 
to sleep in, and company to spend time with. As Jay initially noted and historians have since 
reaffirmed, the average tavern’s conditions were often less than ideal. Nonetheless, David Conroy 
explains that taverns had great value as a place of cross-class engagement. Staying in them was 
likely an enlightening experience for the upper-class, seemingly stiff Jay. Conroy writes, “In 
taverns, men did not ordinarily sit according to their place in the local social hierarchy or merely 
listen to sermons and exhortations. Here there was at least the possibility for greater assertation in 
posture and conversation.” The tavern, unlike the ballroom, the salon, or even the courtroom, was 
a more equal place among white men, leading to new and interesting exchanges.30 The tavern’s 
services likely aided this cultural mixing, since, “In drink, men might abandon the constraints that 
governed interaction in most public situations and thus make taverns a fertile breeding ground for 
new possibilities in social and political relationships.”31 There is little evidence to suggest that Jay 
was a heavy drinker, and plenty to oppose that characterization, but plenty to suggest that he was 
 
28 Stahr, John Jay, 275.   
 
29 John Jay, “Circuit Court Diary, 16 April–30 May 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0134. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 240–258.]  
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sociable and good company to keep. By staying in these environs, he surely met and mixed with 
Americans from all walks of life.32 
 Historically, taverns also served an important public function: the courthouse. Writing in 
the context of the Puritan Massachusetts colony, Conroy explains that since taverns already 
provided heat, light, and residence, they served as the perfect place to hold court for traveling 
judges. The judges “often did not arrive on time or together,” so waiting for others to arrive in 
court seemed nonsensical. Further, Conroy writes, “Rather than move back and forth between 
tavern and town house (if one existed) and duplicate fires and other services in less convenient 
chambers, Massachusetts judicial officers simply made public houses into their seats of authority.” 
Nearly eighty years differentiated the social context that Conroy writes about and that Jay lived 
in; in many ways—especially the rigid social hierarchies of Puritan society—they were a world 
apart. But these more practical concerns, the necessities of life, likely remained true for traveling 
judges trying to administer justice in various social contexts across whole regions.33 Jay never 
explicitly commented about where circuit courts took place, so the possibility remains that he held 
at least one in a tavern. 
 Finally, Jay kept diligent records of who he spoke to while traversing throughout the circuit. 
He spent time with pastors, soldiers, farmers, politicians, and fellow judges. In his first circuit 
court diary, for example, he detailed a conversation with “an elderly man.” Jay explained, “He told 
me he had learned from my Servants who I was—and that he was the Presbyterian Minister of” 
the town Jay was passing through. The minister told Jay that “he had been removed to York State 
 
32 Jay’s moderate disposition, his faith, and his general reputation all help refute the idea that Jay was an 
active drinker. Indeed, during his time in Spain, he and Sarah got into a serious fight with one of his helpers over 
their debaucherous behavior, including excessive drinking. See Stahr, Chapter 6.  
 





28 Yrs. & had not in all that Time voted at any Election, nor intermeddled in any politics—deeming 
it inconsistant [sic] with his professional character & Duties.” Interested in how the minister 
remained a part of the town’s life without involving himself in politics, Jay dubbed the man “a 
case not common.”34 In another entry, he explained that he “passed the [evening] with Mr. Thatcher 
in [company] with Deacon Mason, Judge Sullivan, Mr Tudor, Justice Barret.”35 Notes like these 
demonstrate how Jay spent plenty of time with merchants, farmers, attorneys, men of the cloth, 
and other judges.  
 Jay did not write down the conversations simply for the sake of remembering revelry; 
instead, he often noted them for the valuable information he learned from fellow citizens. At one 
tavern, for example, he wrote with great detail about his conversation with a tavernkeeper about 
the man’s methods for grafting apple trees. Jay explained, “He cuts an oblique Gash into the Side 
of a small tree or Branch, & in it inserts a Graft cut like a Wedge, then covers the wound with 
Clay, & ties it with Rope yarn to keep it close.”36 Keenly interested in agriculture, Jay thought this 
new method was worth remembering. Another time, Jay noted how one of his fellow judges had 
cured a mysterious leg pain. Writing in fragments, Jay explained: 
Judge Law told me at N Haven that he had cured his Leg—by taking for a Week or ten Days 
a Tea spoon full, every morng before Breakfast of burnt oyster Shell, reduced to a fine 
 
34 “Circuit Court Diary, 16 April–30 May 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0134. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 240–258.] 
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36 “Circuit Court Diary, 15 April–1 June 1792,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0210. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 






powder—for many Months his Leg inflamed, broke out & swelled—& he had in Vain 
followd. the Prescriptions of his Physicians— this Powder was a thought of his own.37 
 
One final example demonstrated how information often spread anecdotally through the early 
Republic. Writing about a “Judge Chauncey,” Jay said that “he mentioned to me a Singular Case 
of the Effect of Tobacco Smoke—a Carpenter whom he knew & employed, always fell instantly 
into Convulsions if Tobacco Smoke reached him when he was eating—at other Times it was 
harmless to him— The Judge said he knew it to be true and that the Fact was capable of 
unquestionable Proof.”38 Jay’s letters from his later years indicate that he often suffered from poor 
health, perhaps explaining his early interest in leg pain, tobacco smoke, and other similar issues. 
As wide-spanning as these entries are, they demonstrate one thing for certain: Jay was deeply 
interested in the material world around him and what he could learn from fellow citizens.  
 Jay was nevertheless keenly aware that his words, even in those private diaries, might be 
read by others. In May of 1790, for example, he wrote, “The atty Genl. [Christopher Gore, 
Massachusetts Attorney General] made me a visit. Judge Cushing passed the Day with us—much 
interesting conversation [which] I think had better not be written.”39 Two years later, soon after 
the story from Judge Chauncey, Jay wrote that he “learnt sundry anecdotes [were] not proper to be 
written, but to be remembered.”40 Conscious of the fact that his personal belongings might fall into 
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39 “Circuit Court Diary, 16 April–30 May 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0134. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 240–258.] 
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the wrong hands, and also possibly aware of how his words might end up on the historical record, 
Jay thus complicated his own diaries for historians. We must wonder how much he curated and 
censored them with those concerns in mind.   
 These diaries, however, were not the only records that remain from Jay’s travels. He kept 
up correspondence on the road, writing often to family and sometimes to Washington, Hamilton, 
and others with advisory opinions and news. Jay’s familial correspondence reveals the Chief 
Justice’s deep dedication to his family, and, of course, how his time away from them frustrated 
him. As an influenza epidemic ravaged across the United States in early 1790, for example, he 
wrote to Sarah, “I had hoped that you and our little ones would have escaped the Influenza; and 
feel no little anxiety at learning that has not been the case.” Eager to return to them, he promised 
to travel as quickly as the weather allowed. The next line demonstrated the unreliability of written 
communication in the eighteenth century. “It would give me great Pleasure to receive a Letter from 
you, informing me that your Health & that of our little boy is reestablished,” he wrote, “but as I 
shall be on the Road before the next Post will arrive here, it is uncertain when and where your 
Letter will come to my Hands.”41 He returned home weeks later, and by then, all the family had 
recovered from their illnesses.  
 Months later, as he led a session of the Supreme Court, he wrote a letter to his sister-in-law 
that illustrated his perspective on his work-life balance. “It is the Fortune of few to chuse their 
Situations,” he wrote, but “it is the Duty & Interest of all to accommodate themselves to the one 
which Providence chuses [sic.] for them.” A man of deep faith and reverence for God, he thought 
that Providence had set him on his path, however difficult, for a reason, even if he could not 
 
41 “From John Jay to Sarah Livingston Jay, 20 May 1790,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
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comprehend it himself. He continued, “On my Return from Europe I was placed in an office which 
confined me to my Desk & Papers— I am now in one which takes me from my Family half the 
Year, and obliges me to pass too considerable a part of my Time on the Road, in Lodging Houses, 
& Inns.”42 Briefly referencing his years as the Secretary for Foreign Affairs under the Articles of 
Confederation, Jay seemed to lament about work in all form: when he was working in foreign 
affairs, he felt trapped at his desk, but as Chief Justice, he could not find a moment’s rest. His 
longing for his family and his distaste for a lifestyle on the move were becoming increasingly 
evident. Nevertheless, a Calvinist at his core, Jay believed that everyone had a lot dealt to them in 
life by God and a duty to work to the best of one’s abilities. He continued, for years, to put his 
head down and carry out the mission of the new federal government. 43  
 On the road, Jay also kept correspondence with his son, and he tried to instill in him the 
value of learning, and, particularly, the value of history. In one letter, John wrote to Peter, “Few 
Books (if properly read) afford more useful Lessons than the Lives of great Men; and among 
Biographers Plutarch is certainly entitled to the first Place.” An intellectually curious man and a 
life-long learner, Jay believed that history, at its best, was instructive. “To enjoy the Experience of 
others without paying the Price which it often cost them,” Jay explained, “is pleasant as well as 
profitable— mankind is the same in all Ages, however diversified by colour, manners, or 
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customs.”44 Arguing that humans have a fixed nature and a common tradition of experience to 
draw from, Jay here revealed his explicitly Christian worldview. Further, his interest in Plutarch 
demonstrated how the classical education he enjoyed at King’s College remained in him. Above 
all else, however, letters like these demonstrated that Jay wanted the best for his son, no matter if 
they were separated. He hoped to instill in Peter the same values that his father and his education 
had instilled in him: a sense of duty, an attentiveness towards civic virtue, and a deep Christian 
faith.  
 Taken together, Jay’s diaries and correspondence paint a complicated picture of life on the 
road for him. On one hand, he met people across classes, had interesting conversations with them, 
and learned some took valuable lessons. On the other, all of Jay’s writing reveals how burdensome 
and mundane life on the circuit was. A snowfall or rainstorm could delay him for days, he spent 
much of his time cramped in a carriage or an uncomfortable tavern, and he needed to maintain a 
strict travel schedule in order to keep the courts running as they should. He spent months away 
from his family at a time, and with communication as unreliable as it was, he never knew if his 
letters of encouragement, affirmation, or education would reach them safely. Jay’s diaries and 
letters from the period demonstrate that establishing a court system accessible to the entire nation 
was a demanding, arduous process that took a serious toll on its participants.  
The Process and the Press: Jay’s Circuit Court Decisions and the Public Response 
 A brief article from the Providence Gazette illustrates how the public learned about the 
circuit courts. Writing on December 11, 1790, the author began: “On Saturday last, the Circuit 
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court of the United States for Rhode Island’s District was opened at the Court House in This Town. 
On the following Monday, the Court, consisting of Chief Justice Jay,” as well as Justice Cushing 
and a state judge by the name of Marchant, “proceeded to business.” Beginning ceremonially, Jay 
gave a charge to the grand jury, and the author explained that it was “full of good sense and 
learning, though expressed in the most plain and familiar style.” That charge seemed to be the 
focal point of the session, however, as little came of the courtroom business. “A number of actions 
were commenced in this court,” the author wrote, “but they were either settled or continued, 
without a trial on the merits of any of them, either before the Court or Jury. And on Tuesday 
evening, the Court adjourned.” The issues at hand, undescribed in this article, all were resolved 
through settlement or arbitration, so neither the grand jury nor the Justices needed to adjudicate 
any cases. The article concluded by praising the benefits of this new federal court system 
poetically: “At length have the mild beams of national justice began to irradiate this state, and 
opened a dawn of hope for better times.”45 Though Rhode Island had a serious Anti-Federalist 
culture and was the last of the thirteen states to ratify the Constitution, this citizen was quick to 
praise the federal government’s new mechanism for involving itself in local judicial issues.  
 The Newport Mercury published a similar article a year later. This time, it seemed that the 
court had some serious business to handle. After several days of hearing cases and debating 
verdicts, “The grand jury returned to the court seven bills of indictment. Stephen Pettis and Caleb 
Church were charged with having forged and counterfeited, and offered for sale, the final 
settlement certificates of the United States.” These alleged counterfeiters were “tried and 
acquitted,” and so was Ichabod Darrow, a man charged with selling an “altered and forged Loan-
Office certificate.” To conclude, the author offered their own commentary on the Court’s actions. 
 






“In all their decisions,” Jay and his fellow Justices “gave great satisfaction. Their candour and 
impartiality and discernment were universally acknowledged and applauded. Justice herself 
seemed to preside at the bench and inspire it. The scales were held in every instance with an even 
hand, and gave true weight and measure.”46 Going so far as to say the circuit court personified the 
virtue of justice, the author clearly approved of Jay’s leadership in the judiciary, especially the 
“even hand” with which he “held the scales” of justice. While this piece was originally published 
in the Newport Mercury on June 25, 1791, it soon circulated throughout the country.47  
 These articles speak to two essential aspects of the circuit court system: its interesting 
caseload and its near universal popularity. Elizabeth Nuxoll writes that during Jay’s rides on the 
Eastern Circuit, he heard: 
fifteen common law cases and one chancery case in New Hampshire; sixteen common law 
cases and three criminal cases in Massachusetts; one common law case in Vermont; eighty-
eight common law cases, eleven chancery cases, and five criminal cases in Connecticut; 
forty-two common law cases and eight criminal cases in Rhode Island; and five common 
law cases, one criminal case, and one chancery case in New York. 
 
As Nuxoll indicates, Jay generally heard three types of cases. Criminal cases involved the 
government’s prosecution of someone formally charged with a crime, and these cases were often 
violent in nature. Common law cases and chancery cases more often involved disputes between 
citizens, corporations, or political bodies that could not be solved informally. These disputes were 
often over property, contracts, lands, and debt. In common law cases, Jay had the foundations of 
law to guide his decisions. In chancery cases, however, these principles did not cleanly apply, so 
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Jay had to rule on the more abstract principles of fairness and equity to ensure that the outcome 
was just for all parties involved.48  
 Nuxoll, Stahr, and other scholars have lamented that the source base surrounding pre-
Marshall circuit court decisions is rather narrow. “The sparse and scattered nature of the 
documentary evidence presents difficulties for the study of Circuit court cases” during the Jay 
Court. In fact, Nuxoll explains, the “basis for the opinion rendered is not explained in the records, 
and can only occasionally be ascertained from newspaper coverage. The best-known cases are 
those that were appealed to the Supreme Court and those that involved judicial review of state or 
federal laws.” Though Jay might have ruled on ten cases during a single session, his opinions 
would not have been widely circulated like if he were sitting in the Supreme Court. Instead, a 
summary of the events compiled at the discretion of local newspapers editors informed the public 
about the Circuit court’s proceedings. Similar to Jay’s diaries, the decisions of the Circuit courts 
and the brief newspaper articles that convey those decisions force historians to work backwards in 
discerning how the system operated.49  
In April 1791, as he held court in New Haven, Jay heard a case that involved many 
contentious legal issues—the relationship between creditors and debtors, the enforcement of the 
Treaty of Paris, and the power of the new Circuit court system. As the executor of a deceased 
British merchant from Massachusetts, Samuel Elliot sued Comfort Sage “for the payment of a note 
for £255 lawful money of Connecticut given” to his deceased client “for merchandise purchased 
from him.” Despite the challenges that these cases present historians, scholars have concluded that 
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the Court found in favor of Elliot. They “required full payment of principal and interest without 
any abatement for the period of the war, for a total of £527.17.0. lawful money of Connecticut, or 
$1,759.50, plus court costs amounting to £4.0.6 or $13.41.” Though the rationale behind the 
opinion was not public, Jay’s personal opinions on debt and his involvement in the Paris Peace 
Treaty negotiations can help us understand his decision-making process. Jay firmly believed that 
debtors were responsible for repaying debts. Nuxoll writes, “Prompt payment of debts and 
avoidance of incurring debts that one would be unable to repay were among Jay’s strongest 
personal values, and as a trustee for various family estates he was often involved in the collection 
of debts, including in suits before the Circuit court.” Likewise, a central issue in the Treaty of Paris 
was the settling of debts across sovereign nations. The former colonies and Britain were so deeply 
interconnected through various chains of debtors and creditors, and an absolute severance of those 
chains because of the war would be disastrous for American and British creditors alike. Jay was 
aware of the stakes of the case: if he ruled in favor of Sage, enforcing contracts between Americans 
and Britons would become increasingly difficult for the federal government to enforce. Moreover, 
given that the peace treaty required that such contracts stay in fact, Jay would be complicit in a 
breach of it by ruling in favor of Sage.50  
Several days later, the Middlesex Gazette offered its interpretation of the court’s decision. 
They believed that the question at hand was whether or not “obligations in favor of real British 
subjects, or those who had joined the armies of the King of Great Britain during the war, should 
draw interest during the time the creditors were inaccessible by reason of the war.” Soon after the 
war ended, Connecticut established a law barring these loans from accruing interest. The Gazette 
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explained that the Court struck down the law—perhaps the first instance of a federal court 
nullifying a state’s law. “The statue law of Connecticut enabling the state courts to deduct interest 
in such cases,” the author explained, “was an infringement of the treaty of peace, and that upon 
common law principles, interest was recoverable.” Beyond that, the author did not offer any details 
about the case. Nevertheless, they seemed satisfied with the result, as they concluded, “The learned 
and ingenious arguments from the bench on this question were highly interesting and gave general 
satisfaction.” Yet again, Jay impressed the public with his conduct on the bench.51  
 Below that summary, a satirical piece highlighted the implications of the decision. “Died 
last Thursday,” began this political obituary, “much lamented by those who wish to defraud their 
creditors, an act or law of Connecticut entitled, ‘An act relating to debts due to persons who have 
been and remained within the enemies’ power or lines during the late war.’” The author clearly 
thought that the statute from Connecticut was wrong—the creditors, no matter if they were from 
Great Britain, deserved to receive payments on loans with the interest agreed upon initially. The 
author proceeded to criticize the political culture of his state: “This statue, though of a weakly 
habit, hath yield great service to the people of this state. It has been productive of at least 100,000 
pounds in cash.” Even though the law was poorly made and unjust, it still proved profitable for 
Connecticut residents; as the author indicated, they might have voided up to 100,000 pounds’ 
worth of contracts using it. Jay and his associates, however, brought justice to the situation and 
satisfied the author. Describing how the act fell apart, the author explained: 
It received its death wound by the adoption of the new Constitution, and hath languished 
in extreme agony ever since. On Thursday the 28th, the two-edged sword of justice gave its 
last fatal stroke, and it expired without a groan. Numerous spectators beheld its corpse with 
a smile, and hoped that it might never rise again in this world to our shame, or the world to 
come to our confusion. 
 
 





The new Constitution gave the federal government the power to enforce treaties, so with its 
passage, this 1784 law became susceptible to federal interference. Presenting Jay and his associates 
like knights slaying a beast, the author dubbed the court’s decision the “two-edged sword of 
justice.” For the author and many other Connecticut citizens, this decision was a satisfying one.52  
 The circuit court also wrestled with federal law, and the first known instance of that took 
place in 1792. That year, Congress passed the Invalid Pensions Act, which “required circuit courts 
to hear the claims of Revolutionary War veterans residing in their districts, to decide which of 
them should receive pensions, and to fix the proper amount of each veteran’s pension.” No records 
indicate that Jay heard any pension cases on his first trip around the circuit that year.53 
Nevertheless, once the Justices gathered together in April, they released a letter evaluating the 
validity of the act. 
 The letter began by establishing a basic truth about American government: it is “divided 
into three distinct and independent branches and that it is the duty of each to abstain from and to 
oppose encroachments on either.” Based on that principle, the Justices believed that neither 
Congress nor the President “can constitutionally assign to the judicial any duties but such as are 
properly judicial and to be performed in a judicial manner.” How, exactly, they defined judicial 
was unclear throughout the letter. Nevertheless, they concluded, “The duties assigned to the Circuit 
Courts by this act, are not of that description, and that the act itself does not appear to contemplate 
them as such.” In other words, the Justices deemed this law unconstitutional insofar as Congress 
was asking them to act outside of their judicial capacity.54 
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Yet in the fourth section of the letter, the Justices took a turn in tone. Though they did not 
consider the duty judicial nor the act constitutional, they did believe that the law allowed for them 
to execute its tasks in another fashion. “The business assigned to this Court by the act, is not 
judicial, nor directed to be performed in a judicial manner,” so “the act can only be considered as 
appointing commissioners for the purposes mentioned in it by official, instead of personal 
descriptions.” They argued that the law established new posts: commissioners designated 
specifically to hear these cases. The Justices then explained that they actually “regard themselves 
as being the Commissioners designated by the act, and therefore as being at liberty to accept or to 
decline that Office.” Though the constitutionality of the law was in question, they believed that 
the spirit with which it was written demanded its execution. “The objects of this act are exceedingly 
benevolent, and do real Honor to the humanity and justice of Congress,” they declared, “and as 
the Judges desire to manifest on all proper occasions, and in every proper manner their high respect 
for the national legislature, they will execute this act in the capacity of Commissioners.” Finally, 
in a confusing fashion, the Justices addressed the letter to George Washington in hopes that he 
would deliver it to Congress and thus the public. Jay and the Justices here straddled a fine line. On 
one hand, they believed that this act violated the Constitution given its construction. On the other, 
they believed that the pension applications should be processed through the circuit court, as it was 
the most far-reaching branch of the federal government.55 The personal gave way to the political, 
 
02-0207. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. 
Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 384–387.] 
 
55 “Minutes of the Circuit Court for the District of New York, 5 April 1792,” Founders Online, National 
Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0207. [Original source: The Selected Papers of 







as the sympathies of Jay and the other Justices, combined with their vision of the judiciary as the 
branch of the government, led them to take on the duty irrespective of its additional burdens.  
 Jay and the Associate Justices proceeded to hear many pension cases while riding the 
circuit. In one report, Jay told the story of Yale Todd, a private injured while serving in the 
continental army. In 1775, Todd “was with the rest of [Second] Regiment ordered into Canada 
where by the hardships to which he was Exposed he Contracted a lameness which terminated in a 
fever sore or ulcerated leg.” Seven years later, as Todd was serving as a “Matross in the Artillery 
Regiment of New York,” he was deemed an “invalid” because of long-term complications from 
the 177 illness and thus “discharged by his Excellency the Commander in Chief.” Jay observed 
that Todd’s leg, at the time he appeared before Jay, was “still greatly affected thereby and to such 
a degree as almost entirely to disqualify and disable him from pursuing his Usual Employment and 
day labor.” Jay, Cushing, and the district judge thus concluded that Todd “be placed on the Pension 
List that he ought to be paid at the rate of two third parts of his former Monthly Wages.” Overall, 
Todd received a pension of eight dollars a month, as well as one hundred and fifty dollars to cover 
time that his pension was deemed invalid.56  
 While certainly burdensome on the Justices, the circuit court was almost universally 
popular among the public. Newspapers throughout the Eastern circuit praised Jay’s ability as a 
fair-minded and knowledgeable jurist. In the early years of the Republic, as many were likely still 
skeptical of the Constitution, the circuit court offered citizens an opportunity to work with the 
federal government in their own communities. Further, through the circuit court, Jay was able to 
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review and overturn state and federal statutes. Perhaps most importantly, however, Jay was able 
to come closer to bringing “justice to every man’s door.” From the creditors and merchants affected 
by the Paris Peace Treaty to the veteran seeking compensation for his service in the war for 
independence, Jay and the Associate Justices met and served citizens from all walks of life in these 
traveling courts. 
The Tolls of Travel: The Justices Conflict Over Their Circuit Duties 
As the Justices adjudicated their way throughout the nation, they internally bickered about 
riding the circuit. They established initial rotations in the February 1790 session, but by the time 
they met again in August, only their second meeting ever, they began to disagree about their duties. 
Stahr explains that Jay quickly conflicted with James Iredell, who “argued in August that the 
circuits should be rotated among the justices so that the burden would be shared equally.” Iredell 
missed the first meeting of the Supreme Court where they established the initial circuit 
assignments, and he was frustrated by the results. Nevertheless, the assignments—Jay and Cushing 
in the Eastern Circuit, Blair and Wilson in the Middle Circuit, and Iredell and Rutledge in the 
Southern Circuit—remained as they were. The Justices departed with no changes to their rotations. 
This small disagreement in the summer of 1790 was the first of many fights about the circuit 
rotations.57  
Next February, soon after the Supreme Court met for another session, a letter from Iredell 
to the other Justices demonstrated his perspective on the situation. “I submit to you,” he began, 
“that some more equitable rule in the allotment of Circuits so unequal in point of duty ought to 
take place, than that they should be forever fixed in the same manner in which they were for a 
temporary reason at first.” As the last man to join the court, Iredell had gotten the worst assignment, 
 





and he was deeply frustrated. “A fixed duty is not annexed to any of the Judges by the law,” he 
observed, “Had I continued to live to the Southward, and constantly attended the Circuit, I must 
have travelled the same distance in a year, as my duty requires me to be twice in a year at the seat 
of Government.”  These Circuit court assignments were not fixed in law, he claimed; instead, the 
Justices had the liberty to assign circuits to themselves as they saw fit. The double duty of Southern 
circuit riding and holding court in New York meant that Iredell was almost always on the road, as 
he had to travel between the Southern Circuit, his home, and the Supreme Court in New York.58 
Iredell then appealed to the physical burdens and dangers that came with all that travel. “I 
will venture to say no Judge can conscientiously undertake to ride the Southern Circuit constantly, 
and perform the other parts of his duty,” he explained, “Besides the danger his health must be 
exposed to, it is not conceivable that accidents will not often happen to occasion a disappointment 
of attendance at the Courts.” In undertaking a mission to execute the vision of the judiciary as laid 
out in the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Constitution, Iredell argued that his own constitution, his 
health and wellness, had suffered from the burdens of travel. Writing about the challenges of being 
on the road like Jay often did, Iredell believed that sustaining such a nomadic lifestyle was 
unrealistic. A carriage accident, an illness, or weather could force a Justice to fall behind his strict 
schedule and throw the entire schedule into disorder. Likewise, trying to repeat the longest circuit 
year after year, although it would bring experience and wisdom in traveling, also would bring great 
strains to Iredell’s health. “I rode upon the last Circuit 1900 miles: the distance from here and back 
again is 1800,” he wrote. “Can any Man have a probable chance of going that distance twice a 
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year, and attending at particular places punctually on particular days?” While Jay only traveled 
about five hundred miles for each Eastern Circuit trip, Iredell had done nearly four times that for 
each Southern Circuit ride. Moreover, while Jay already resided in New York, where the Supreme 
Court met, Iredell was from South Carolina. Rarely over the past year did he get to see his family.59 
Iredell’s desperation for a rotation, even a temporary one, also stemmed from a personal 
dilemma. “I now beg leave to state to you one, why I apprehend it would be peculiarly improper 
that I should for some time go the Southern Circuit,” he explained. “A Writ of Certiorari issued 
from the Circuit court of North Carolina, by the direction of Mr. Wilson, Mr. Blair, and Mr. 
Rutledge, directed to the Judges of the Court of Equity in North Carolina, for bringing up a Cause 
in which (as an Executor) I am one of the Defendants.” The other Justices had recently granted a 
writ of certiorari—a commitment to review a lower court’s decision—to a civil case involving an 
estate that Iredell was the executor of. The conflict of interest became evidently clear here. Iredell 
concluded the letter with a passionate plea. He wrote: 
My situation is a very hard one. I had no reason to suppose any thing but a rotation would 
take place, and accordingly when I had the honour to be appointed one of the Judges of the 
Supreme Court I resolved to remove my Family to the seat of Government, in order that I 
might be enabled to perform the duty of my office more faithfully than I thought I could 
possibly do in so remote a situation.60  
 
He had expected that a rotation would come, and he was devastated to learn the opposite. He even 
moved his family from South Carolina to New York in order that he could spend more time with 
them, but another 2,000-mile trip down south meant that move would be moot. Perhaps even more 
than Jay’s correspondence, this letter illustrated the awful impact of riding the circuit on a Justice’s 
life.  
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Jay responded briefly and politely the next day. Recognizing the gravity of the situation, 
he assured Iredell, “I have not the least objection to re-examining the merits of the Question of 
Rotation. If the Decision on it at New York should on further Consideration appear to have been 
erroneous, it ought to be relinquished.” Further, he explained that the burdens placed on Iredell 
were “doubtless great and unequal,” but nevertheless, “an adequate Remedy can in my opinion be 
afforded only by legislative Provisions.” It would be difficult to get any Justice to volunteer for 
the arduous Southern circuit willingly, so much so that Jay believed Congress would have to 
legislate the requirement into existence. Finally, Jay passed the responsibility of helping Iredell 
onto the other Justices: “Judge Cushing & myself have points of some Importance reserved, on 
which we expect to decide this Spring in the Eastern Circuit. Perhaps Judge Wilson & Judge Blair 
may be differently circumstanced— if so, I think it would be expedient for one of them to attend 
that court in your Stead.” This polite yet cold and unhelpful response from Jay further illustrated 
how divisive this issue was. Only ten days before, Jay had written that letter to his sister-in-law in 
which he complained at length about how his duties took him away from his family. Now, as 
another Justice complained of the same problem, he chose not to assist him. Though no further 
correspondence on this matter exists between the two, it surely did not help their already tenuous 
relationship.61 
Jay and Iredell met again at Supreme Court sessions throughout 1791, but their next 
correspondence that dealt with the issue of rotations came nearly a year later. Writing to Jay, Iredell 
expressed his frustration that no change had come of the incident from last year: “I did think the 
particular circumstances of my situation made it necessary, for the honour of the U.S., that at least 
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a temporary change should take place.” Again referencing the conflict of interest involving the 
execution of a will, Iredell saw the issue as one of honor. Nevertheless, he made it clear that he 
had hoped some more serious change might come about. “I certainly however can no longer agree 
to be placed on the unequal and distressing journey upon which I have so long been,” he wrote, 
“although I trust no other will be more zealous than I always shall be to discharge my duty so far 
as it is practicable.” Practically threatening to remove himself from the court, Iredell nonetheless 
remained committed to fulfilling his responsibilities so long as they were “practicable.” To that 
extent, he then commented on his hopes for future reform efforts. Iredell observed, “I see no 
prospect of any radical change, although I have some hopes Congress will amend the law in such 
a manner as to express the sense whether there will or will not be rotation.” To this point, Congress 
had not taken any action on the issue. Nevertheless, Iredell remained optimistic. He concluded the 
letter with an interesting remark unrelated to the issue of circuit riding. He wrote, “I hope you will 
forgive my regretting the danger we are in of losing you for our Chief Justice, though it might by 
means of your appointment to another more agreeable to you personally.”62 Given the timing of 
this letter, Iredell was likely alluding to Jay’s involvement in the ongoing race to be the Governor 
of New York. While Jay did not campaign at all, he was the most prominent and powerful 
Federalist from the state and thus the natural candidate.63 Iredell interestingly noted that Jay might 
find the governorship “more agreeable” to him personally. Perhaps Jay had made his 
dissatisfaction clear to the Justices in their meetings, or perhaps Iredell was projecting his own 
 
62 Iredell to Jay, February 16, 1792. apt://columbia.edu/columbia.jay/data/jjbw/03976/03976001.tif 
 
63 Though certainly out of the scope of riding the circuit, the 1792 campaign for governor was an important 






distaste for the job onto Jay. In either case, the comment signaled clear frustration on the part of 
some Justices. 
Jay responded to Iredell about a month later, again deflecting the issue to Congress. He 
began: “The Difficulties attending that Subject can in my opinion be removed by Congress only.” 
Yet he soon sympathized with Iredell, claiming that the objections against the system were 
“insuperable.” He articulated that Congress had fallen short in his eyes, as he “had flattered myself 
that the System would have been revised during the present Session. The Expediency of a Revision 
appears to be generally acknowledged.” At this point, all of the Justices agreed that reform was 
needed, but they seemed to disagree about the exact nature of the reform. In order to settle things 
fairly, Congress had to act. Thus far, they failed to do so. Nevertheless, Jay concluded, “Whatever 
may be the Circumstances which cause the Delays of Congress relative to it, I regret them.” The 
tone of these letters, several months after their earlier and terser exchanges, demonstrated a 
growing amicability between Iredell and Jay. 64  
In March of 1792, Congress finally took action by passing the Judiciary Act of 1792. Above 
all else, the act put into practice the reform that Iredell had been trying to achieve for almost two 
years. Section Three established, “No judge, unless by his own consent, shall have assigned to him 
any circuit which he hath already attended, until the same hath been afterwards attended by every 
other of the said judge.”65 No longer could Jay establish the arrangements singularly. Instead, the 
duties of riding the circuit would be doled out equally—Iredell would not have to bear the burden 
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of the Southern Circuit twice a year, and Jay would no longer be able to ride only the Eastern 
Circuit.66  
Yet this reform seemed to placate only Iredell, and not even him for much longer. Only 
five months later, in August of 1792, the Justices gathered together to pen the letter they sent to 
Washington and Congress. They found the circuit court system to be problematic on both 
constitutional and logistical levels—constitutionally, it created conflicts of interest as the same me 
reviewed cases on the circuit court and the Supreme Court, and logistically, the travel burden 
placed on the Justices was excessive. After explaining their problems, they concluded with an 
“earnest request [to Congress] that it may meet with early attention, and that the System may be 
so modified as that they may be relieved [sic.] from their present painful and improper situation.” 
To Washington, they likewise remarked, “We really, Sir, find the burthens laid upon us so 
excessive that we cannot forbear representing them in strong and explicit terms.” The Justices’ 
frustration practically dripped off the page.  
Further adjustments to the structure of the courts came the next year. The Judiciary Act of 
1793 expanded the circuit’s flexibility by reducing the number of Supreme Court Justices 
necessary for a quorum. “The attendance of only one of the Justices of the supreme court at the 
several circuit courts of the United States,” Section 1 established, “shall be sufficient.” Moreover, 
in certain circumstances, a Supreme Court Justice could hold the court without even the district 
judge. Reducing the quorum to two judges, however, meant that there needed to be a new rule for 
a split court. Congress decided that if that were to occur, there would be another trial that occurred, 
and if at the second trial, the same outcome occurred, “judgement shall be rendered in conformity 
to the opinion of the presiding” Supreme Court justice. Finally, the act gave Justices new powers 
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in holding special sessions for criminal cases.67 The act included other smaller procedural 
adjustments, but these three parts were the most significant. It certainly granted the Justices much-
needed flexibility in their routes. For example, if one of the Justices had gotten sick and could not 
travel, the other Justice riding the circuit alongside him could carry on and hold court anyway.68  
After that act, the Justices no longer debated the issue through correspondence. It is unclear 
whether this piece of legislation satisfied the Justices or made them accept that no further change 
was coming or even worth entertaining. Jay continued to ride the circuit for the remainder of his 
time on the Court, and he rarely lamented about the duty afterwards. Historians and legal scholars 
have already noted the tangible impact of these trips on the Justices, especially James Iredell and 
William Cushing. Steven Calabresi, a constitutional law professor, characterized the trips as 
“onerous” and even “dangerous.” Further, he argued that Iredell died in 1799 “at the youthful age 
of forty-eight, in part because of the rigors of circuit riding in the southern circuit, where roads and 
accommodations were still quite scarce.”69 Iredell served on the Supreme Court for nine years, and 
in riding the Southern Circuit so many times, he traveled over 15,000 miles to fulfill the Circuit 
court duties alone. Historian Herbert Alan Johnson painted a similarly grim picture of the end of 
Justice William Cushing’s life. “As [Cushing] aged,” Johnson observed, “The circuit duties began 
to take their toll on his health, and he considered retirement as a possibility. This was complicated 
by the fact that he had been on the Bench for so long that he had no private fortune and was 
 
67 An Act in addition to the Act entitled “An Act to establish the Judicial Courts of the United States.” 
Second Congress, Session Two. Annals of Congress, Chapter 21, 1793. 
https://govtrackus.s3.amazonaws.com/legislink/pdf/stat/1/STATUTE-1-Pg333a.pdf 
68 Indeed, for Jay, that clause must have been welcome—in an earlier session of the circuit court, he rode 
alongside William Cushing. Cushing became ill in Rhode Island and could not carry on to New Hampshire. 
Although Jay tried to hold court himself, he lacked the jurisdiction to do so, and as Stahr observes, he was “no doubt 
annoyed.” (282) 
 
69 Steven G. Calabresi and David C. Presser, “Reintroducing Circuit Riding,: A Timely Proposal,” in 






dependent upon his salary as a judge to maintain himself in the necessities of his.” In 1810, 
Cushing faced “the impossible choice of an impecunious retirement or death from riding the 
circuit.” He chose the latter, dying in the first stages of his journey in Scituate, Massachusetts.70 
These grim outcomes demonstrate that the Justices were not complaining just for the sake of doing 
so. Year after year, these journeys wore down their bodies, minds, and spirits.  
Of course, the physical nature of circuit-riding and the brutality it imposed on the Justices 
cannot be overstated. Yet its legacy in the formation of the Supreme Court as an institution is more 
complex. As newspaper coverage indicated, the Justices were well-received everywhere they went. 
The Justices heard cases of all sorts—from stories of murder and treason to accounts of fraud and 
bankruptcy. These cases offered the Justices excellent opportunities to build on the Court’s power, 
and they took advantage of that—especially in the instances of Elliot v. Sage and the Invalid 
Pensions Act. Perhaps most simply, the circuit court helped reinforce the idea that the United States 
were now united under a single tradition of law. While thirteen states each had their own codes of 
law, the circuit courts were a reminder that the federal government and a national common law 
connected these political bodies. Especially when manned by Supreme Court Justices, as in the era 
of Jay, these courts brought together the federal and the local to create new trust in the American 
project. Indeed, as one Rhode Island newspaper observed in 1790, the circuit courts brought about 
a new sense of “national justice.” For the average American citizen, perhaps unsure of what a new 
United States meant, these opportunities to interact with the federal government, and more 





70 Herbert Alan Johnson, “William Cushing,” in Justices, ed. by Friedman and Israel, 57.  
 




















CHAPTER THREE:  
DUELING FEDERALISMS:  
CHISHOLM v. GEORGIA, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT, AND THE DECLINE OF 
THE JAY COURT 
 
 Twelve years before John Jay was selected as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, he found 
himself more responsible for establishing the law than interpreting it. Amidst the political turmoil 
of the American Revolution in the late 1770s, he served in a number of important roles at the state 
level. In 1777, he was selected as the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of New York. As he 
adjudicated civil and criminal cases, he simultaneously battled over the new constitution of the 
state of New York, dueling with the likes of Gouvernor Morris, George Clinton, and Robert 
Livingston. He even sat on a special “Council of Safety” with the governor to manage the local 
war effort. Yet as Jay tried to win independence for the young nation, events were unfolding in 
Savannah, Georgia—nearly eight-hundred miles to the south, a world away from the courtrooms 
of Albany and New York City—that would contribute to the eventual failure of his national vision 
and the decline of his court’s power.1  
 





 On October 31, 1777, the state of Georgia purchased nearly $170,000 worth of goods from 
Robert Farquhar, a merchant from South Carolina. Desperate to sustain the Southern campaign, 
Georgia’s government ordered a significant amount of “cloth, thread, silk, handkerchiefs, blankets, 
coats, and jackets” for revolutionary troops stationed nearby. Georgia officials Thomas Stone and 
Edward Davies promised Farquhar payment on December 1, provided that he delivered the 
supplies by then. Merchant records indicate that he did so on November 3. Doyle Mathis, a 
historian particularly concerned with reconstructing the often-contested details of this case, 
explains that Stone and Davies never followed through on their end of the deal. “On December 2 
Farquhar requested payment, as he was to do several times thereafter, but he was refused,” Mathis 
writes, “A committee of the Georgia house of representatives in 1789 reported that Georgia had 
paid Stone and Davies the necessary sum in continental loan office certificates for the specific 
purpose of satisfying Farquhar. However, from all evidence obtained, Farquhar received no part 
of the funds.” Georgia had failed to fulfill its obligation to Farquhar, despite the legal obligation 
they had to him.2   
 The fight for Farquhar’s money extended far beyond his lifetime. In 1784, he fell overboard 
a ship and drowned “when he was hit by the boom of a pilot boat coming into Savannah.” A 
wealthy merchant, he left an extensive will that gave his ten-year-old daughter control of his estate. 
“The executors of Farquhar's estate named in his will,” Mathis explains, “were his father, John 
Farquhar, Peter Dean, a merchant of Savannah, and Alexander Chisholm, a merchant of 
Charleston.” These three men, all personally vested in recouping Farquhar’s funds, fought tooth 
and nail to recover the money Georgia owed him. They first unsuccessfully petitioned the state 
 
2 Doyle Mathis, "Chisholm v. Georgia: Background and Settlement,” The Journal of American History 54, 






legislature to act. Passing the responsibility onto Stone and Davies, the legislature urged the 
executors to sue them directly.3  
 Taking primary responsibility as the executor, Alexander Chisholm instead brought his 
case before the United States Circuit Court in October 1791. As the court date approached, one 
Augusta newspaper wrote about the importance of the case:  
This case being without precedent and the Judiciary of the United States not pointing out 
any mode of serving a process upon any of the states—and also the Judiciary Act of this 
state, expressly requiring that a bill or petition be filed in the Superior Court of the County 
in which the seat of government may be, by any plaintiff against the state, render it 
necessary that a local opinion be had in the premises without delay.4 
 
According to the author, neither federal nor local statutes explicitly allowed citizens to sue states 
that were not their own. Instead, he thought the case should be settled locally. Nevertheless, in 
making its way to the Circuit Court, the case now involved the federal government. As Mathis 
explains, Justice James Iredell and Judge Nathaniel Pendleton presided over the case, and they 
both ruled that Chisholm did not have the right to sue Georgia to recoup these funds. Unsatisfied 
with the response, Chisholm decided to appeal to the only higher power that remained: the 
Supreme Court.5  
 This chapter explores the Justices’ opinions on Chisholm v. Georgia, the most significant 
case that Jay and the Associate Justices heard under his leadership. While the question at hand 
appeared to be a simple one—whether or not a citizen of one state can sue another state—the ruling 
mattered for several reasons. The first significant constitutional interpretations to come out of the 
Supreme Court, Jay and Iredell’s opinions presented two competing understandings of federalism. 
 
3 Mathis, "Chisholm v. Georgia,” 21-22.  
 
4 Augusta Chronicle, July 21, 1791, quoted in Mathis, "Chisholm v. Georgia,” 22-23. 
 





Ever concerned with national union, Jay’s opinion outlined a vision of government that more so 
resembled nationalism than the federalism we typically associate with his era. Conversely, Iredell 
articulated an understanding of federalism grounded in states’ rights, placing the federal 
government absolutely subservient to the states.6 Though the other judges ruled with Jay and his 
nationalist opinion won out in this case, Iredell’s understanding of federalism soon became the 
dominant school of thought throughout the nation. Congress soon moved to pass the Eleventh 
Amendment as a repudiation of Jay’s ruling; its reaction demonstrated another failure of Jay to 
execute his robust nationalist vision, further contributing to his frustration and eventual departure 
from the Court.  
The Attorney General and the Empty Chair: Edmund Randolph’s Opening Arguments 
 
 The Chisholm case first appeared on the Supreme Court’s minutes in the summer of 1792. 
Representing Alexander Chisholm, Attorney General Edmund Randolph had previously submitted 
a request stating, “Any person having authority to appear for the State of Georgia in the suit 
brought in this court by Alexander Chisholm citizen of South Carolina and Executor of Robert 
Farquhar of the same State, deceased, against the said State of Georgia, is required to come forth 
and appear accordingly.” Since the Circuit Court had ruled a year prior that Chisholm had no right 
to sue Georgia, no one from Georgia responded to that request. On August 11, Randolph submitted 
another motion: “Unless the said State of Georgia shall after reasonable previous notice of this 
motion cause an appearance to be entered in behalf of the said State, on the fourth day of next 
term, or shall then shew cause to the contrary, judgment shall be enter’d against the said State and 
 
6 For more information on nationalism in the early Republic, see David Waldstreicher’s In the Midst of 







a writ of enquiry of damages shall be awarded.” Randolph demanded that Georgia attend those 
court proceedings, and if they did not, a “writ of enquiry of damages” would be issued by the 
federal government. In other words, Randolph viewed Georgia’s absence as forfeiting the case and 
immediately ruling in favor of Chisholm. The court, sensitive to the serious demands of 
Randolph’s motion, instead postponed their decision until the following February term.7 
 Seven months passed, and the Supreme Court again came into session. Yet again, Randolph 
sat patiently waiting for the defense to arrive. It never did, and so, as the minutes explain, “The 
Court proceeded to hear the Attorney General in support of his motion in this cause but considering 
that no appearance had been entered on the part of the State of Georgia.” Randolph rose to begin 
his arguments.8  
Randolph first identified the two central issues at the heart of the case: whether or not 
Chisholm had the right to sue Georgia, and if he had the right, how that right should be enforced 
if the state fails to comply. Concerning the first question, he turned to Article III, Section Two of 
the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789. Outlining the scope of the Supreme Court’s powers 
as defined by those documents, Randolph explained that two principles become clear. The first 
principle, he claimed, was that the Constitution “vests a jurisdiction in the Supreme Court over the 
State as a defendant at the suit of a private citizen of another State.” The second, similarly, was 
that the Judicial Act of 1789 “recognizes that jurisdiction.” He urged the Justices to “consult the 
letter of the Constitution, or rather the influential words of the clause in question.” Because the 
 
7 “Minutes of the Supreme Court, [6–11 August 1792],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0237. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 440–444.] 
 
8 “Minutes of the Supreme Court, [4–20 February 1793],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0249. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 






Constitution established that the Supreme Court had the power to hear cases “between a State and 
citizens of another state,” Randolph argued that citizens thus had the right to sue states.9  
Randolph anticipated that Georgia might make a legalistic argument framed around the 
phrasing of the Constitution. They might have argued that because the ordering of the 
Constitution’s words, “between a State and citizens of another state,” meant that only the state 
could serve as a plaintiff.10 To that point, Randolph responded, “Human genius might be 
challenged to restrict these words to a plaintiff state alone.” In other aspects of that same clause, 
like conflicts between foreign nations and individual citizens, the word “between” did not restrict 
the plaintiffs to solely foreign nations. Further, “In common language,” Randolph explained, “it 
would not violate the substantial idea if a controversy, said to be between A.B. and C.D. should 
appear to be between C. D. and A.B.” Randolph argued that as a preposition and a legal term, 
“between” held no connotations of directionality. Both precedent and common sense seemed to 
support his interpretation of the clause.11  
Beyond these grammatical interpretations, Randolph argued that if a citizen could not sue 
a state, the state’s power seriously threatened the rights of individual citizens. “States may injure 
individuals in their property, their liberty, and their lives; may oppress sister States; and may act 
in derogation of the general sovereignty,” he explained, “Government itself would be useless if a 
 
9 Edmund Randolph, opening argument in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1793 WL 685, 1 
L.Ed. 440.  
 
10 A brief explanation of legal terms is helpful to understand Georgia’s argument: in a case, the plaintiff is 
the one who initiates the case, and the defendant is the one being accused of wrongdoing. When we read court cases, 
the plaintiff always comes first. In this case, Chisholm v. Georgia, Chisholm, the citizen, was the plaintiff, and he 
sued the state of Georgia, the defendant, for wrongdoing. Georgia, in refusing to acknowledge that this trial was 
even valid, argued that because the Constitution reads, “controversies between a state and citizens of another state,” 
that the Court could only hear cases between states and individuals where the state was the plaintiff, based on the 
order of words in the original phrase of the Constitution. Jay does not accept that line of argument.  
 





pleasure to obey or transgress with impunity should be substituted in the place of a function to its 
law.” Randolph saw law, and particularly the litigation process, as a central mechanism for 
preventing tyranny. If states became immune to litigation through a ruling in favor of Georgia, 
then their power might become almost unlimited. It would certainly, he believed, damage the 
balance of power between the states and the federal government. Randolph outlined some of the 
potential ramifications in a dramatic crescendo towards his conclusion: 
What is to be done, if in consequence of a bill of attainder, or an ex post facto law, the 
estate of a citizen shall be confiscated, and deposited in the treasury of a state? What if a 
state should adulterate or coin money below the Congressional standard, emit bills of credit, 
or enact unconstitutional tenders, for the purpose of extinguishing its own debts? What if 
a state should impair her own contracts? These evils, and others which might be enumerated 
like them, cannot be corrected without a suit against the State.12 
 
Here, Randolph illustrated the point he explained abstractly towards the beginning of his speech. 
He particularly emphasized the potential for financial tyranny, using the image of the state seizing 
the estate of a citizen unfairly. Though he made no direct reference to the plight of Robert Farquhar 
here, nor anywhere throughout this speech, he alluded to it in this important passage. Further, 
Randolph demonstrated how unchecked state power could have a serious impact on the country’s 
finances. A state might be able to print money excessively and pay off debt to individuals unjustly, 
without any regulation from the federal government or potential checks from affected citizens. 
Without any sort of restraint, a state might make contracts with citizens from other states—like 
Farquhar—and fail to fulfill them.13  
Randolph proceeded to reflect on the concept of state sovereignty. He did not deny that the 
states were sovereign entities; in fact, he emphasized it several times throughout his oral argument. 
Instead, he insisted that states must recognize where their power comes from: the people. “The 
 
12 Randolph, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1793 WL 685, 1 L.Ed. 440.  
 





people individually are, under certain imitations, subject to the legislative, executive, and judicial 
authorities thereby established,” he explained, “The States are in fact assemblages of these 
individuals who are liable to process.” As assemblages, or bodies composed of their many parts, 
states, too, were subject to the processes of the three branches of the federal government. Randolph 
then articulated the importance of balancing competing spheres of government historically. 
Referencing ancient Greece, the Helvetic Union, and the Germanic Empire, he argued that states 
and their larger unions needed to remain accountable to each other in order to remain stable and 
functioning. Otherwise, the idea of a federal government as it now stood served no purpose. Yet 
this accountability, he made clear, was not a bad thing. “I hold it,” he claimed, “to be no 
degradation of sovereignty in the States to submit to the Supreme Judiciary of the United States.” 
Rather than a degradation of state power, it was a necessity for the function of ordinary governance, 
derived from both the nation’s foundational legal documents and a proper understanding of 
sovereignty within nations.14 
Randolph then tended to the final issue at hand: enforcement of court rulings. He first 
expressed what he thought of any state refusing to submit to the Supreme Court. “That any state 
that should refuse to conform to a solemn determination of the Supreme Court of the Union,” he 
lamented, “is impossible, until she shall abandon her love of peace, fidelity to compact, and 
character.” Yet if the court ruled in favor of Randolph and Chisholm and Georgia still refused to 
appear, Randolph contended that the federal government needed to intervene and display its power 
over the irascible state. Recognizing that such a strong understanding of the federal government 
may not have been palatable to everyone on the court, however, Randolph worked to assuage any 
fears of centralized tyranny. “The prostration of states-rights is no object with me,” Randolph 
 





concluded, “but I remain in perfect confidence, that with the power which the people and the 
legislatures of the States indirectly hold over almost every movement of the national government, 
the States need not fear an assault from bold ambition, or any approaches of covered stratagem.” 
Randolph certainly did not want the states to be subservient to the federal government—they did 
not need to fear “an assault from bold ambition” or secretive, devious plots to usurp their individual 
power.15  
After Randolph concluded his arguments, the Court reportedly came to a temporary 
impasse. No one from Georgia had come to make an argument on behalf of the state, but the 
Justices considered this a “highly important” suit. They made a special offer: “If any are disposed 
to offer their sentiments on the subject now under Consideration the Court are willing to hear 
them.” Since no formal counsel had come forward on behalf of Georgia, the Justices offered any 
lawyer in attendance the chance to make an argument on behalf of the state.16 As Stahr tersely 
notes, however, “Apparently none did.”17 Instead, court adjourned for the day, and the Justices 
returned to their chambers to begin thinking about how to respond to this peculiar case. 
Two Ways Forward: Iredell and Jay’s Conflicting Federalisms 
On February 18, after two weeks of anticipation, the Justices delivered their opinions on 
the issue. While today, the Court rules as one body and releases only majority and dissenting 
opinions, Jay established that the Justices would all read their own opinions seriatim, or in order 
 
15 Randolph, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1793 WL 685, 1 L.Ed. 440. 
 
16 “Minutes of the Supreme Court, [4–20 February 1793],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0249. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 
5, 1788–1794, ed. Elizabeth M. Nuxoll. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2017, pp. 457–466.] 
 






of rank.18 The courtroom was brimming with anticipation as its members waited to hear the 
decision. 
The Justice who initially ruled against Chisholm more than a year before, James Iredell, 
rose.19 As the most recent Justice to join the Supreme Court, he was considered the most junior, 
and he thus had to read his opinion first. Iredell began by restating the question at hand: “What 
controversy of a civil nature can be maintained against a State by an individual?” He proceeded to 
argue that the Framers had two ideas in mind regarding constitutional interpretation: either the 
Supreme Court should “refer to antecedent laws for the construction of the general words they 
use” in order to find the answer or Congress should pass all laws “necessary and proper to carry 
the purposes of this Constitution into full effect” and offer the Supreme Court a clarified position 
in law. But Attorney General Randolph, Iredell claimed, interpreted the Constitution differently, 
even dangerously. In Iredell’s estimation, Randolph argued, “The moment a Supreme Court is 
formed, it is to exercise all the judicial power vested in it by the Constitution, by its own authority, 
whether the Legislature has prescribed methods of doing so, or not.” For Iredell, Randolph had 
presented a dangerously powerful vision of the Court: a body that acts with its own authority and 
interprets the laws as its members see fit, not as Congress has legislated them. The Supreme Court 
itself could decide what civil controversies “can be maintained against a State by an individual.”20  
 
18 On this tradition, Stahr writes, “The court followed the English common law practice, in which each 
justice would consider and write up his own opinion, which were read out in order, from junior to most senior. This 
arguably reflected a failure of imagination of Jay’s part, a failure to consider whether a more collegial system would 
strengthen the court” (294). Indeed, it is interesting that a man so interested with national union failed to recognize a 
good opportunity for union within his own institution by changing the way in which the Court released decisions.  
 
19 It is interesting to note that this case exemplifies the sort of conflict discussed at the beginning of Chapter 
Two. Iredell ruled on this case in the Circuit Court, and now, he ruled on it again in the Supreme Court. His opinion 
did not change significantly at all—the substantial difference was his addressing of Randolph’s arguments, as seen 
throughout the opinion.  
 





Iredell quickly distanced himself from that conception of the Constitution. “All the Courts 
of the United States,” he explained, “must receive, not merely their organization as to the number 
of Judges of which they are to consist; but all their authority, as to the manner of their proceeding, 
from the Legislature only.” In other words, he believed Congress should write the law and the 
Supreme Court should interpret it very narrowly. Rarely was there room for extrapolation from 
the Supreme Court. Congress, however, had broad powers to create laws, most clearly established 
in the “Necessary and Proper Clause.” Yet Congress had not passed any laws specifically 
establishing that a citizen can sue a state. There were sections of Article III, Section 2 of the 
Constitution that Iredell believed were tangentially related, but based on the construction of their 
language, they were not applicable in this case. Likewise, the Judiciary Act of 1789 was relevant 
and necessary to consider, but none of the provisions were written with such clarity that the 
Supreme Court could take on Chisholm v. Georgia without overstepping its boundaries. With no 
federal legislation to draw from, Iredell suggested that states’ laws and the common law were the 
only other sources of instruction the Court could draw from. After briefly surveying state laws, 
Iredell argued:  
I believe there is no doubt that neither in the State now in question, nor in any other in the 
Union, any particular Legislative mode, authorizing a compulsory suit for the recovery of 
money against a State, was in being either when the Constitution was adopted, or at the 
time the judicial act was passed. Since that time an act of Assembly for such a purpose has 
been passed in Georgia. But that surely could have no influence in the construction of an 
act of the Legislature of the United States passed before. 
 
When both the Constitution was ratified and the Judiciary Act was passed, neither Georgia nor 
South Carolina had any standing legislation that authorized the Supreme Court to hear a claim for 
“the recovery of money against a State.” Georgia, afterwards, passed such a law regarding their 





Iredell believed it was unreasonable to assume that the authors of these documents intended to 
imbed that claim of compulsory suits within them.21 
Iredell then turned to common law, which he quickly connected to the concept of state 
sovereignty. He first drew from the Tenth Amendment. “Every State in the Union in every instance 
where its sovereignty has not been delegated to the United States,” he wrote, “I consider to be as 
completely sovereign, as the United States are in respect to the powers surrendered.” The 
Constitution only allowed the branches of the federal government to act within the constraints 
explicitly established in the document. In cases where lines blurred and spheres of influence 
collided, Iredell believed that the states often had the power to claim sovereignty over the federal 
government. Likewise, he explained, “The United States are sovereign as to all the powers of 
Government actually surrendered: Each State in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers 
reserved.” Turning back towards the Judiciary Act, which Iredell considered the “limit of our 
authority,” he claimed that the Supreme Court “can exercise no authority in the present instance 
consistently with the clear intention of the act, but such as a proper State Court would have been 
at least competent to exercise at the time the act was passed.” No such authority existed when any 
of the relevant pieces of federal legislation were passed, and so the Supreme Court had no standing 
and no authority to act on Chisholm’s behalf.22 
To summarize his argument, Iredell reiterated three points. First, he explained, “The 
Constitution, so far as it respects the judicial authority, can only be carried into effect by acts of 
the Legislature appointing Courts, and prescribing their methods of proceeding.” The legislature 
held power over the courts, and by passing legislation, it clearly delineated where they could act. 
 
21 Iredell, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1793 WL 685, 1 L.Ed. 440.  
 





The court, in turn, had no power to act in circumstances not clearly established. Second, he 
claimed, “Congress has provided no new law in regard to this case, but expressly referred us to the 
old.” Since there were no more recent laws to help guide the Court in acting, the Justices needed 
to turn to precedent. In doing so, Iredell concluded, “There are no principles of the old law, to 
which, we must have recourse, that in any manner authorise the present suit, either by precedent 
or by analogy.” His examination of state statues and English common law demonstrated no clear 
legal pathway for federal judicial intervention.23 
Finally, Iredell concluded that the Supreme Court did not have the authority to hear the 
case at all. Taken to be true, the three above principles meant that “the suit in question cannot be 
maintained, nor, of course, the motion made upon it be complied with.” Instead, “a new law is 
necessary for the purpose, since no part of the existing law applies, this alone is sufficient to justify 
my determination in the present case.” If Chisholm wanted to be satisfied, Iredell believed he 
should turn to the legislature, rather than the courts, in order to force the state to comply with the 
contract. “My present opinion is strongly against any construction of [the Constitution], which will 
admit, under any circumstances, a compulsive suit against a State for the recovery of money, he 
explained, “Nothing but express words, or an insurmountable implication (neither of which I 
consider, can be found in this case) would authorise the deduction of so high a power.” Neither 
the language of the Constitution nor the spirit with which it was written supported Chisholm’s 
claim. With that remark, Iredell again took his seat.24  
Justices Blair, Cushing, and Wilson next delivered their opinions. Each ruled in favor of 
Chisholm, declaring that a citizen had the right to sue another state in court. Finally, Jay stood to 
 
23 Iredell, Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. 419, 2 Dall. 419, 1793 WL 685, 1 L.Ed. 440.  
 





read his opinion. Like the other Justices, he began by reiterating the question at hand: “Is a State 
suable by individual citizens of another State?” Acknowledging the strange situation that Georgia 
created in its courtroom absence, he explained, “Georgia refuses to appear and answer to the 
Plaintiff in this action, because she [contends she] is a sovereign state, and therefore not liable to 
such actions.” He then began considering three issues at hand that would help determine if 
Chisholm had a right to sue Georgia.25  
First, Jay considered “in what sense Georgia was a sovereign state.” He turned back to 
colonial times, explaining that before the Constitution, all people in the colonies were subjects of 
King George. Power “flowed” from the King, and he had the authority to act as he pleased upon 
his subjects. But as the people of the American colonies came together in Revolution, Jay 
explained, “thirteen sovereignties” emerged under a “confederation of the states, the basis of a 
general government. Experience disappointed the expectations that had formed from it, and the 
people, in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution.” In doing so, 
Jay believed, “the people exercised their own rights, and their own proper sovereignty.” This act 
of establishing their own sovereignty over the whole country with a national constitution, he 
explained, was essential in establishing a precedent that “the state governments should be bound” 
to the Constitution. Jay then argued that the “sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the nation, 
and the residuary sovereignty of the state in the people of each state.” Comparing this system of 
circumscribed sovereignties to the feudal systems of Europe, Jay explained that Americans “are 
sovereigns without subjects” and “have none to govern but themselves—the citizens of America 
are as equal as fellow citizens” and as “joint tenants in the sovereignty.” Finally, he articulated a 
 
25 “John Jay’s Opinion, Chisolm v. Georgia, [18 February 1793],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0251. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 





definition of sovereignty to utilize for the rest of the opinion: “Sovereignty is the right to govern; 
a nation or state-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides.” To return to the initial 
question, Jay determined that Georgia was a sovereign state insofar as it was governed by the 
citizens who reside in it; nevertheless, it was legally obligated to uphold the laws and principles 
established by the Constitution. 26  
Second, Jay reflected on “whether suability is incompatible with such sovereignty.” In 
other words, Jay wanted to know whether sovereign states could be sued by different political 
entities. He first articulated various legal relationships that were commonly agreed upon. “One 
free citizen may sue another,” he wrote, and “one free citizen may sue forty thousand; for where a 
corporation is sued, all the members of it are actually, though not personally, sued.” Citizens can 
sue corporations, like cities that have forty-thousand people, and thus it makes sense that a citizen 
can sue a state of fifty thousand. But, as Jay explained, that common-sensical reasoning alone is 
not sufficient to prove that a citizen can sue a state. He turned next to the relationship between 
states. “Any one state in the union may sue another state” in the Supreme Court, he explained, and 
using his definition of sovereignty, he argued that when one state sues another, it really means that 
“all the people of one state may sue all the people of another state.” Sovereignty as a political body 
did not grant immunity from being sued, he believed, and he thus concluded that “suability and 
state sovereignty are not incompatible.” Further, he explained: 
Why it should be more incompatible that all the people of a state should be sued by one 
citizen rather than by one hundred thousand, I cannot perceive—the process in both cases 
being alike—the judgements alike—and the consequences of the judgements alike. Nor 
can I observe any greater inconveniences in the one case than in the other, except what may 
arise from the feelings of those who may regard a lesser number in an inferior light. 
 
 





If states, as sovereign political entities composed of citizens, can sue each other, then a citizen, a 
part of a sovereign state, should have the right to sue another state. The numerical size between 
the individual and the state, Jay believed, were just that: numerical. Appearances of 
inconvenience—such as the idea that a man, in suing a state, burdens the entire population of that 
state—should not interfere with justice, and based on this logic, Jay contended that a citizen could 
sue a state as a sovereign body.27  
But logic alone could not suffice in establishing this as legal precedent. Turning to the law 
of the land, Jay lastly considered “whether Georgia has not, by being a party to the national 
compact, consented to be suable by individual citizens of another state.” Before the Constitution 
had been established, Jay explained, there was no “national tribunal to which [the people] could 
resort for justice.” The new Constitution provided that, and the federal judiciary was particularly 
responsible for delivering the six objects listed in the preamble to the Constitution: forming a 
“more perfect union,” establishing justice, ensuring “domestic tranquility,” providing for the 
“common defense,” promoting the “general welfare,” and securing “the blessing of liberty.”28 Of 
course, given the role of the courts in the new federal government, establishing justice was its most 
relevant duty. Jay asked, “What is the precise sense and latitude which the words, ‘to establish 
justice,’ as here used, are to be understood?” He found his answer in Article III, Section 2, where 
the Constitution described ten types of cases that the courts should consider. Most relevant was 
the eighth type of case: “controversies between a state and citizens of another state.”29 Jay 
 
27 Jay, Chisholm v. Georgia. 
 
28 It is noteworthy that Jay drew from the preamble to the Constitution in writing this opinion. Rarely in the 
history of Constitutional law is it referenced at all or reflected on seriously by Justices.  
 
29 The other nine types of cases Jay listed were: “all cases arising under this Constitution,” “all cases arising 
under the laws of the United States,” “all cases arising under treaties made by their authority,” “all cases affecting 
ambassadors, or other public ministers and consuls,” “all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,” “all 





explained that Georgia contended, “this [phrase] ought to be constructed to reach none of these 
controversies excepting those in which a State may be plaintiff.” In other words, Georgia attempted 
to read the Constitution incredibly strictly: because the original phrase in the Constitution lists the 
state first in the type of controversy, Georgia argued that the Constitution can only apply to those 
cases in which the State is the plaintiff.  
Jay did not accept that argument. Since “the extension of power is remedial, because it is 
to settle controversies,” he explained, “it is therefore to be construed liberally. It is politic, wise, 
and good that, not only the controversies in which a state is plaintiff, but also those in which a state 
is defendant, should be settled.” The argument that Georgia provided was semantical and against 
not only the “spirit, but the very words of the Constitution,” Jay believed, and he pointed to other 
examples throughout American government as evidence. A later clause in Article III, Section 2, 
established that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction “in all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other 
public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party.”30 Nowhere, Jay wrote, 
did the word party singularly refer to the plaintiff, and it could have easily been written to mean 
so if that were true. Likewise, the Judiciary Act often referred to the State as a party, and the act 
did not “impliedly or explicitly apply that term to either of the litigants in particularly.” At this 
point, Jay’s opinion became abundantly clear: he believed that an individual did have the 
constitutional right to sue a state.31 
 
between citizens of the same state,” and “controversies between a state or the citizens thereof and foreign states.” 
The distinction between case and controversy, though not explicitly mentioned in Jay’s address, is an important one 
in the fields of legal theory and jurisprudence. More information here: https://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution-
conan/article-3/section-2/clause-1/the-two-classes-of-cases-and-controversies.  
 
30 Article III, Section 2.  
 





Before stating that explicitly, however, Jay meditated on the stakes of the case and, more 
broadly, the value of the judiciary in ensuring that every citizen has an opportunity to pursue 
justice. “I have made no references to cases,” he explained, “because I know of none that are not 
distinguishable from this case; nor does it appear to me necessary to shew that the sentiments of 
the best writers on government and on the rights of man harmonize with the principles that direct 
my judgement.” He characterized his own interpretation of the essential phrase from Article III, 
Section 2 as both “honest” and “useful.” The honesty in his interpretation, he believed, was quite 
clear; this interpretation “provides for doing justice without respect of persons, and by securing 
individual citizens and states in their respective rights, performs the promise which every free 
government makes to every free citizen, of equal justice and protection.” The utility of his opinion, 
however, was far more significant. Jay believed that the Constitution “leaves not even the most 
obscure and friendless citizen without means of obtaining justice from a neighboring state.” 
Likewise, the Constitution “rests on this great moral truth, that justice is the same whether due 
from one man to a million or from a million man to won.” Finally, it reaffirmed that the people, 
not the states, “are the sovereign of this country.”32 This bold vision of federalism, which 
emphasized the relationship not between states, but rather between citizens and the federal 
government, flew in the face of Iredell’s conception of federalism and the most popular notions of 
it throughout the nation at the time.  
 In the final paragraph of the opinion, Jay finally established that a “state is suable by 
citizens of another state.” Yet he immediately qualified that statement by limiting the scope of the 
power. “Such suability may nevertheless not extend to all the demands, and to every kind of action, 
he explained. “There may be exceptions—for instance—I am far from being prepared to say that 
 





an individual may sue a State on bills of credit issued before the constitution was established, and 
which were issued and received on the faith of the State, and at a time when no ideas or 
expectations of judicial interposition were entertained or contemplate.” In other words, Jay did not 
declare that Georgia owed Chisholm the money immediately; instead, in this opinion, he 
established that it was legal for Chisholm to sue Georgia in the first place.  
 Though brief, the minutes of the Supreme Court explained what occurred next. First, the 
Court ordered “That certified Copies of the said declaration be served on the Governor and 
Attorney General of the State of Georgia on or before the first day of June next.” Moreover, Jay 
and the Associate Justices declared, “Unless the said State shall either in due form appear or shew 
cause to the Contrary in this Court by the first day of the next term Judgment by default be entered 
against the said State.” Chisholm had won the right to sue Georgia, and the Court soon doled out 
the proper papers to initiate the actual trial. Further, the Court finally made good on Randolph’s 
motion from August 1792—if representatives from Georgia failed to comply and appear before 
the Supreme Court, the Justices would immediately rule in favor of Chisholm.33 
The States Rule Supreme: Congress’ Retaliation and the Failure of Jay’s National Vision 
 
In the weeks and months that followed the release of Jay’s opinion, Federalists and Anti-
Federalists alike rebuked his understanding of state sovereignty. Historians have debated the 
rapidity with which Congress acted in response to the opinion, primarily through the medium of 
what would become the Eleventh Amendment, but all accounts clearly emphasize the universal 
unpopularity of the ruling in Chisholm. Jay, a private man through and through, left little direct 
evidence to demonstrate his frustration with the legislative and public responses towards his ruling. 
 
33 “Minutes of the Supreme Court, [4–20 February 1793],” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0249. [Original source: The Selected Papers of John Jay, vol. 





Nevertheless, tracing his political decisions in the years that followed allows us to see that after 
Chisholm, Jay soon began to distance himself from the Supreme Court and the construction of a 
vigorous national government.  
In his landmark series on the history of the Supreme Court, historian Charles Warren argues 
that Congress took action to dismantle the Chisholm ruling the very next day. He claims that 
Representative Theodore Sedgwick introduced a resolution establishing that “no state shall be 
liable to be made a party defendant” in any federal court “at the suit of any person or persons, 
citizens or foreigners, or of any body politic or corporate” in the United States.34 In a 
reinterpretation of the history of the Eleventh Amendment, federal judge John Jacob Gibbins 
argues that Warren’s sources were inaccurate. “The Annals of Congress for the week of February 
18, 1793, however, disclose no such resolution and no discussion of Chisholm in the House of 
Representatives,” he writes. “A search of the National Archives, moreover, has produced no 
evidence of such a resolution in official government records,” and so “the existence of such a 
resolution thus appears dubious.” Instead, a day later in the Senate, an unidentified Senator 
proposed a new constitutional amendment: “The Judicial power of the United States shall not 
extend to any suits in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
citizens of another state, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.” Yet, as Gibbins observes, 
no one took serious action beyond this initial proposal. The Congressional term ended a month 
later with no serious progress on the matter.35 
 
34 Charles Warren, The Supreme Court in United States History (1922), 101, quoted in John Gibbons’ “The 
Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,” 1926.  
 
35 John J. Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,” 





As news of the opinion traveled from Philadelphia throughout the young nation, however, 
states were quick to take action themselves. Massachusetts and Virginia were particularly bold in 
their responses. Governor John Hancock of Massachusetts almost immediately pulled a resolution 
to attempt to securing states’ immunity in court. In a message to the state government and the 
public at large, he proclaimed, “A consolidation of all the States into one government would at 
once endanger the Nation as a republic and eventually divide the states united, or eradicate the 
principles which we have contended for.” Regarding the Supreme Court’s recent decision, 
Hancock explained, “It is much less hazardous to prevent the establishment of a dangerous 
precedent, than to attempt an abolition of it, after it has obtained a place in a civil institution.”36 
Seeking to mitigate the fallout from the Chisholm decision, Hancock and the state legislature 
sought to convene a national constitutional convention. Virginia simultaneously lobbied a similar 
message in the South, and Gibbons explains how eager states were to reaffirm their rights. “By the 
time the Third Congress convened in December [1793], the matter was before the legislatures of 
New Hampshire, Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Delaware,” on top of Virginia and Massachusetts. Only a month later, the New York legislature 
took up the issue as well.37   
The Third Congress began to consider the issue seriously in the earliest days of 1794. On 
January 2, an unknown Senator introduced the phrase that would eventually become the Eleventh 
Amendment. He declared, “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
 
36 Message of Governor John Hancock to the Senate and House of Representatives, Resolves of 
Massachusetts 31-32, September 18, 1793, in Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment,” 1931.  
 
37 Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment,” 1931. Gibbons makes an interesting argument that integrates 
foreign policy and the judiciary in his reinterpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. He claims, “States’ rights had 
become political for Francophiles, an attractive slogan around which to rally, for only the national government had 
any real hope of enforcing the neutrality proclamation” and preventing the United States from getting heavily 






extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by 
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.”38 As Gibbons notes, 
“This language differed from that introduced in the previous Congress” only slightly: by adding 
“be construed to.” Senator Albert Gallatin and another unknown Senator attempted to change the 
phrasing of the words slightly, but their amendments failed. Instead, the amendment passed nearly 
unanimously in the Senate and, days later, passed in the House by an 81-9 vote. It was thus 
submitted to the states for ratification, and three-fourths would have to do so in order for this new 
amendment to become the law of the land.39 
All the while, Jay continued to serve on the court. He still held sessions in Philadelphia 
twice a year, and he continued to travel the circuits faithfully. Yet after the vitriolic response to 
Chisholm, Jay never again delivered an opinion so strong in national vision or so aggressive in its 
ruling. The February 1794 term especially illustrated Jay’s reluctance to act. The court had what 
Stahr sarcastically dubs “a full calendar” during that session: a measly “two pension appeals, a 
British debt case, and an international admiralty case.” In the British debt case, Jay and the 
Associate Justices instead turned to a jury to decide the issues at hand. The jury ruled in favor of 
the defendants, and in doing so, “vindicated the right of a British creditor, regardless of a state 
statute, to recover a pre-war debt.” Jay, in turn, avoided issuing another controversial opinion by 
ruling in favor of British creditors, and to that end, Stahr writes, an opinion “could well have 
received the same criticism as the Chisholm opinions.”40  
 
38 Annals of the Third Congress, January 2, 1794, 25. https://memory.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ampage?collId=llac&fileName=004/llac004.db&recNum=10 
 
39 Gibbons, “The Eleventh Amendment,”1933-1934. 
 
40 That is not to say Jay totally abstained from the case. Indeed, he helped the jury resolve two important 
legal questions—whether or not Georgia’s statutes placed the rights of the defendants in the hands of the state, not 
the federal government, and whether or not the Paris Peace Treaty detailed the rights of creditors. Jay answered in 





 By the middle of 1794, Jay began to move away from the Supreme Court, as he became far 
more involved in the Washington Administration’s handling of the crisis with Britain.41 Jay 
returned from the treaty negotiations in winter 1795 to great news: he won the office of governor 
of the state of New York.42 On July 29, 1795, Jay delivered his resignation to President 
Washington. “Having been elected Governor of the State of New York,” Jay wrote, “It is proper 
that I should, and therefore I do hereby resign the office of chief Justice of the United States.” He 
explained that his office as governor began in only a few days, and he needed to resign as soon as 
possible in order to avoid any conflicts of interest. Jay enclosed the resignation within another 
letter, personally addressed to Washington and filled with much warmer sentiments. To the 
President, Jay wrote, “I cannot quit it, without again expressing to You my acknowledgments for 
the Honor you conferred upon me by that appointment; and for the repeated marks of confidence 
& attention for which I am indebted to You.” Washington had been instrumental in Jay’s rise to 
prominence, plucking him from the talented crop of lawyers and statesmen and placing him atop 
the young nation’s highest court. Jay led it for six years, and although that time undoubtedly tested 
him like no other, he wrote with deep gratitude towards the President. In a kind closing remark, 
Jay further expressed his fealty to Washington:  
It gives me pleasure to recollect and reflect on these circumstances—to endulge the most 
sincere wishes for your Health and Happiness—and to assure you of the perfect Respect 




41 There are plenty of strong historical accounts of Jay’s involvement in the infamous treaty that now bears 
his name, but an extended treatment of that issue is far outside the scope of this project. Nevertheless, there is 
something to be said for how foreign policy influenced the judiciary, particularly in regards to debt claims from 
British creditors before and during the war. For some interesting accounts of the Jay Treaty and the connection 
between the Supreme Court and Foreign Policy, see Gibbons, previously referenced, and Stahr, Chapter 14.  
 
42 While not especially relevant to the narrative and argument of this chapter, Jay’s candidacies for 





After years of partisan turmoil had rocked the Washington White House, Jay’s reaffirmation of his 
friendship and faithfulness to Washington must have been comforting to the President. Their long 
political partnership—beginning nearly fifteen years earlier in the midst of the American 
Revolution—had finally come to an end. With that letter, Jay took his leave of the court, and John 
Rutledge was soon confirmed as the next Chief Justice.43 
 Jay’s departure from the Supreme Court was certainly not sudden, nor was it a surprise to 
anyone close to him. Even in 1792, Justice Iredell—perhaps the Justice least close with Jay—had 
already commented on how he feared that Jay might resign from his post. Though his departure 
was a long time in the making, Chisholm v. Georgia served as a very clear inflection point for 
Jay’s relationship with the court and the nation. Before the ruling, Jay had delivered vigorous grand 
jury charges that had a hopeful vision for a robust, powerful federal judiciary and national 
government.44 His 1793 ruling in Chisholm was arguably the most aggressive step he took in trying 
to achieve that vision. He attempted to carve out serious power for the Supreme Court, giving it 
the right to oversee suits between citizens and states. Likewise, he tried to encode into law and 
precedent a new understanding of sovereignty that placed far more power in the hands of the 
federal government than many of his peers were comfortable with. After, in response to the almost 
universal rebuke of his opinion, he balked on his national vision and his sweeping conception of 
the Supreme Court as a powerful entity. Certainly frustrated with his duties riding the circuit and 
likely disappointed in the bipartisan response to his ruling, he became a far less active Chief 
 
43 “To George Washington from John Jay, 29 June 1795,” Founders Online, National Archives, 
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/05-18-02-0208. [Original source: The Papers of George 
Washington, Presidential Series, vol. 18, 1 April–30 September 1795, ed. Carol S. Ebel. Charlottesville: University 
of Virginia Press, 2015, p. 272.] 
 
44 That is not to say that Jay loved the Court before Chisholm. Indeed, as we will consider in the conclusion, 
Jay was a serious contender for the governor of New York in 1792, and if he had won, he likely would have left 





Justice, and he passed on rulings that might have been controversial.  Likewise, as conflict between 
France and England began to boil, he informally returned to his previous role of advisor on foreign 
affairs and soon became the United States’ lead diplomat on a pivotal negotiation journey. All the 
while, states began ratifying the Eleventh Amendment to enshrine the failure of Jay’s vision into 
the Constitution. Indeed, though Jay had sought to bind the nation together under the federal 
government in order to promote unity and prosperity, Iredell’s understanding of federalism as state 
sovereignty ruled the day and dominated the nation’s political discourse throughout the next 














CONCLUSION: WHAT SHOULD WE MAKE OF THE JAY COURT? 
LESSONS FROM JAY AND HIS TENURE AS CHIEF JUSTICE 
 
With weapons, cameras, and signage in hand, a violent mob stormed the United States 
Capitol on January 6, 2021 in an attempt to overturn the 2020 presidential election. Angry 
insurrectionists clashed with outnumbered Capitol police officers, thugs flew cheap mesh “Trump 
2020” flags off the Capitol’s beautiful granite banisters, and a bloodthirsty mob burst into the 
chamber of the House of Representatives as it tried to stop Congress from certifying the results of 
the Electoral College. Despite the mob’s best efforts, the insurrection failed. Unsuccessful in their 
attempts to kidnap and harm legislators, the rioters left the building in disgrace. At four in the 
morning the next day, Congress certified that Joseph Biden won the election and would be the 46th 
President of the United States.  
Two weeks later, on a sunny day with a clear blue sky—a stark contrast to the dreary gray 
overcast that came with the insurrection—President Biden gave his inaugural address to the 
American people. His speech explored the numerous crises that the country faced, from COVID-
19 and widespread unemployment to systemic racism and environmental justice. At its core, 





times. “I know speaking of unity can sound to some like a foolish fantasy,” he said, “I know the 
forces that divide us are deep and they are real. But I also know they are not new. Our history has 
been a constant struggle between the American ideal that we are all created equal and the harsh, 
ugly reality that racism, nativism, fear, and demonization have long torn us apart.” In an age of 
hyper-partisanship exacerbated by novel technologies and ever-compounding crises, Biden 
promoted a message of moderation, compromise, and patience. He explained, “History, faith, and 
reason show the way, the way of unity. We can see each other not as adversaries but as neighbors. 
We can treat each other with dignity and respect. We can join forces, stop the shouting, and lower 
the temperature.” Whereas his predecessor and other partisans sought to stoke the flames of hate 
and fury, Biden tried to reorient the discourse towards civility and progress.45  
The stakes of the moment demanded nothing less. “For without unity,” Biden explained, 
“there is no peace, only bitterness and fury. No progress, only exhausting outrage. No nation, only 
a state of chaos. This is our historic moment of crisis and challenge, and unity is the path forward.” 
As Biden gave his speech, he looked out towards a small crowd of supporters, masked and 
physically distanced to mitigate the spread of COVID-19. Behind those supporters, not so far in 
the distance, the president could clearly see a symbol of history that represented a similarly partisan 
age: the Washington monument.46  
The story of John Jay and his tenure as Chief Justice illustrates that deep partisanship and 
conflicts over the federal government’s power and purpose are not new problems in the United 
States. In fact, these problems are as old as the nation itself. While Biden’s pleas for unity seem 
 









uniquely situated to our present moment, they invoke a long and storied tradition of American 
Union—a tradition popularly centered around Abraham Lincoln, but one that began in earnest 
eighty years earlier, as the states debated whether or not they would ratify the new Constitution. 
Jay argued in the Federalist essays that maintaining union would be central to the success of the 
American project. “Not only the first, but every succeeding Congress,” he remarked, “as well as 
the late convention, have invariably joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of 
America depended on its Union.” If America failed to come together around the Constitution, 
investing its power in a new centralized government, it might become an easy target for European 
adversaries. Even worse, it could tear itself apart over sectional conflicts if no larger regulatory 
power existed. No matter how union might fracture, the results would be the same. “Whenever the 
dissolution of the Union arrives,” Jay lamented, “America will have reason to exclaim, in the words 
of the poet: ‘FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS.’”47 Jay worked 
hard to make that Union a reality in the 1780s, not only as a writer, but also as a political actor. He 
famously brokered a deal between Anti-Federalists and Federalists at the New York Ratifying 
Convention in Poughkeepsie that led the state to support the Constitution. Assuaging the Anti-
Federalists’ fears, he promised them a Bill of Rights in exchange for ratification. While other 
Federalists balked at their opponents’ concerns, Jay saw reason in them; in promising to fight for 
a Bill of Rights, he simultaneously brought the Anti-Federalists into the fold and delivered the 
Federalists one of the most important states in the Union. 
Jay’s involvement in the creation of an American Union increased significantly once he 
became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. As his tenure began, he expounded the same optimism 
 






for the project of union that he held throughout the 1780s. In his first jury charge, for example, he 
remarked: 
Providence has been pleased to bless the people of this country with more perfect 
opportunities of choosing, and more effectual means of establishing their own government, 
than any other nation has hitherto enjoyed…our deliberations and proceedings being 
unawed and uninfluenced by power or corruption, domestic or foreign, are perfectly free; 
our citizens are generally and greatly enlightened, and our country is so extensive that the 
personal influence of popular individuals can rarely embrace large portions of it.48  
 
Yet as time went on, Jay became weary of the judiciary’s power and its ability to promote national 
political stability. He never expressed these sentiments publicly, but his private correspondence 
and political maneuvering suggest frustration and even disappointment with the national project. 
Indeed, only two years after being named Chief Justice, it appeared that he was considering 
alternative career paths. In 1792, Jay was almost elected Governor of the State of New York. 
Though he never formally campaigned, his popularity in the state secured him the Federalist 
nomination, and he lost the election by only five hundred votes. All circumstantial evidence 
suggests that he would have taken the position had he won. His letters to his family illustrated 
clear frustration with riding the circuit on top of holding the Supreme Court twice a year. Even 
Justice Iredell, considered the odd man out in the early years of the Jay Court, suspected that the 
New York Governor’s race would pull Jay away from the federal judiciary, and he said as much 
in a letter to Jay as they debated the merits of rotating circuit duties. 
 Three years later, upon his return from negotiating the treaty with England that now bears 
his name, Jay learned that he had again been the Federalist nominee for the governor of New York. 
This time, he won the election, and he quickly resigned from the Supreme Court to take the top 
 
48 John Jay, “Charge to the Grand Juries of the Eastern Circuit, 12 April–20 May 1790,” Founders Online, 
National Archives, https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Jay/01-05-02-0133. [Original source: The Selected 







spot in New York’s government. He never again entered the national political scene. Five years 
later, he remarked to John Adams that he “left the Bench perfectly convinced that under a System 
so defective, it would not obtain the Energy weight and Dignity which are essential to its affording 
due support to the national government.” The system’s defects were clear: the double duty of riding 
the circuit and holding the Supreme Court. Though Congress legislated on the issue twice, they 
failed to satisfy the needs of Jay and his Associate Justices. Moreover, Jay believed that the 
Supreme Court would never “acquire the public Confidence and Respect, which, as the last Resort 
of the Justice of the Nation, it should possess.” While the circuit courts clearly helped establish the 
federal judiciary’s power and prominence, the universal rebuke of Jay and his Court regarding 
Chisholm v. Georgia disillusioned Jay significantly. From that point on, he deferred to juries in 
making decisions and spent more time aiding Washington in foreign policy than adjudicating cases 
with his fellow Justices. Congress Quickly passed the Eleventh Amendment and sent it to the 
states, potentially enshrining a rejection of Jay’s thought right into the document that he fought for 
so vigorously.49  
Jay’s tenure on the Supreme Court illustrates three ideas important to understanding the 
early Republic. First, and perhaps most obviously, statecraft and governance were not easy tasks. 
No matter how well Jay, Hamilton, and Madison had laid out their political systems in newspapers, 
pamphlets, and letters, putting these systems into practice presented the Founders serious logistical 
and philosophical challenges. As Jay remarked in that first optimistic grand jury charge, “The most 
perfect constitutions, the best governments, and the wisest laws are vain, unless well-administered 
 







and well-obeyed.”50 Simply put, the proper administration of Article III of the Constitution and 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 was burdensome and onerous. Jay quickly learned that the reality of 
governance on the unprecedented scale the federal governance brought to the United States would 
be a massive endeavor, one unlike anything he or the other Founders had seen before.  
The problems that came with bringing “Justice to every man’s door” reveal the second 
lesson from the Jay Court: being a Supreme Court Justice in the 1790s was not a desirable position. 
All of the Justices, but especially Jay, came to see their job as a burden rather than an opportunity 
to establish and secure justice for all citizens. As explained in Chapter Two, riding the circuit was 
the source of many of their problems. It caused constant infighting among the Justices, it separated 
them from their families for months at a time, it forced them to trek through a nation lacking 
national infrastructure, and it took a serious toll on their physical health. Though the Justices 
became popular on the circuits, they traveled hundreds of miles in short durations of time, lodged 
in less-than-ideal conditions, almost always at the mercy of the weather and the environment. 
Scholars have gone so far to attribute Justice Iredell’s untimely demise to the burdens of constant 
travel, and Justice Cushing embarked on his final circuit journey in 1810 confident it would be a 
death sentence. Indeed, as the Justices sought to carry out the mission of the Constitution, their 
own constitutions suffered for it. They often left the court disillusioned and frustrated, if they were 
able to leave at all.  
Finally, the fight for Robert Farquahr’s inheritance reveals the third lesson: that the true 
nature of federalism has always been contested both in the judiciary and in the public discourse. 
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Justice Iredell’s understanding of federalism as state sovereignty carried the day, but its long-term 
implications for the nation were disastrous. Southerners took up the mantle of states’ rights as a 
way to defend the pernicious institution of slavery, eventually leading to the Civil War. The sudden 
rise of the Republican Party and the emergency of Abraham Lincoln, however, revived the 
understanding of federalism as nationalism, as they reinvigorated the federal government to secure 
the union. Ever since, there has been an ongoing battle between the dueling federalisms over the 
power and scope of the federal government. Few recognize Jay or Iredell as foundational thinkers 
in this debate, but both the ideological and political implications of their opinions in Chisholm v. 
Georgia demonstrate that any narratives involving federalism should include that pivotal case.  
Jay’s story also offers us valuable lessons as we struggle in a partisan age not dissimilar to 
his own. From the Washington administration to the Biden administration, from the Jay Court to 
the Roberts Court, the United States has always grappled with what being “united” really means. 
When some speak of unity, they mean it in a cultural sense: they want everyone to agree on 
cultures, religions, or other value systems and worldviews. In that case, however, unity often 
becomes exclusive rather than inclusive: those who conform benefit, while those who do not or 
cannot suffer. Moreover, modern liberal democracy, with its foundational principles of freedom 
of thought and expression, almost by definition ensures that cultural unity is impossible to achieve 
in the United States. There will always be contrarians, dissenters, and rebels in a society as 
culturally and ideologically pluralistic as our own, and frankly, that is for the best.  
 The unity that Jay, Lincoln, Biden, and so many others value must be something else. 
Rather than unity of culture, perhaps the ideal of American unity rests on the simple principles of 
mutual toleration and respect, not only for fellow citizens, but also for the structures and systems 





right to disagree peaceably, and above all else, for the proposition that every person is created 
equal—could go a long way in fixing our political discourse. The political problems that we 
struggle with today are not new. Nor are the solutions we propose to fix them. We know what the 
issues are, and on paper, we know what the solutions should be. Yet Jay’s story reminds us that 
there is an enormous distance between the ideal world, composed neatly in sentences and 
paragraphs on a piece of paper, and the real world, with its bumpy roads, its unexpected twists and 
turns, its searing tragedies, and its broken people.  
Recognizing that distance should not invoke feelings of resignation and despair, but instead 
feelings of hope and duty. Indeed, it should inspire us to turn back towards history and take cues 
from public servants who have faced these problems before like Jay: principled, patriotic, and 
firmly dedicated to bringing justice to every person's door. Today, we need leaders that emulate 
Jay’s finest qualities at every level of our society, from the federal government to the local Student 
Congress. His triumphs remind us that we can create a system that leads to just outcomes through 
fair constitutions, firm principles, coalition-building, and compromise. More than most Founders, 
Jay avoided the partisan rancor of the time and tried to accomplish his goals acting in good faith. 
His failures remind us that our achievements are ephemeral if we are not vigilant. Creating lasting 
true change requires constant attention, deep resolve, and a strong commitment to and involvement 
in our community. 
In 1785, as Jay saw the new nation flounder under the Articles of Confederation, he wrote 
to his friend Richard Price. “The cause of liberty like most other good causes,” Jay explained, “will 
have its difficulties and sometimes its persecutions to struggle with.” Those difficulties and 
persecutions, however, did not invalidate the principles that Jay and his countrymen fought for in 





granted, especially freedom and democracy, are fragile. Jay then offered his friend some advice 
that remains poignantly relevant today: 
The wise and the good never form the majority of any large Society and it seldom happens 
that their measures are uniformly adopted or that they can always prevent being overborne 
themselves by the strong and almost never ceasing union of the wicked and the weak. These 
circumstances tell us to be patient and moderate those sanguine expectations, which warm 
and good hearts often mislead even wise heads to entertain on these subjects. All that the 
best men can do is to persevere in doing their duty to their country and leave the 
consequences to Him who made it their duty; being neither elated by success however great 
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